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ABSTRACT
Nearly 90 percent of the opinions issued by the federal courts of appeal are unpublished and lack
precedential effect, and where these cases lay out new legal rules, this phenomenon cannot be reconciled
with the Supreme Court’s settled retroactivity jurisprudence. Harper v. Virginia Board of Taxation
and Griffith v. Kentucky, both moored in Article III, require that any case’s new rule apply not only to
future litigants but also to those whose cases are pending. A nonprecedential case by definition has
no application beyond its litigants. This raises no problem where a case adds nothing new, as other
litigants already have access to the precedents on which it relies. However, the majority of circuits allow
nonprecedential opinions to break new ground, and these nonprecedential opinions frequently make
law, command dissents, create or deepen circuit splits, and go up on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Many commentators have debated the practical and legal implications of nonprecedential opinions,
but this Article is the first to identify the inconsistency between groundbreaking nonprecedential
opinions and settled principles of adjudicative retroactivity. This Article concludes that permitting
nonprecedential opinions as an exception to adjudicative retroactivity threatens to drain Harper and
Griffith of all but symbolic significance. Although a handful of circuits have guidelines for when an
opinion must have precedential effect, this Article proposes use of the “new rule” construct, already
familiar and well-developed in the context of habeas corpus and official immunity, as a mechanism
for differentiating those opinions that may be designated nonprecedential from those that—under
settled doctrine—may not.
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INTRODUCTION
A staggering 88.7 percent of the work product of the federal appellate
courts consists of opinions that lack precedential effect.1 This phenomenon
rests uneasily with settled retroactivity doctrine. These nonprecedential2
opinions can break new ground, draw dissents, and deepen circuit splits.3 On
occasion, they even go up to the U.S. Supreme Court.4 Although litigants can
cite to these opinions,5 subsequent courts have no duty to grapple with them,
even when they have altered or clarified preexisting rules, and even when they
have applied settled rules to brand new contexts.6 Commentators have often
debated, and sometimes lamented, the role that nonprecedential opinions play
in our system.7 To date, however, no one has recognized the clear conflict
between a groundbreaking nonprecedential opinion and settled principles of
adjudicative retroactivity.
In a series of opinions spanning several decades, the Supreme Court
has developed a bright-line rule requiring full retroactivity for opinions in all
or nearly all pending civil cases8 and all criminal cases pending on direct
review.9 On the books, the Court has made clear that, when it applies a legal

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—TYPES OF OPINIONS OR ORDERS FILED IN CASES TERMINATED
ON THE MERITS, BY CIRCUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30,
2016, UNITED STATES COURTS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8CA-9FCD]; see also In re
Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). In Grant, the D.C.
Circuit noted its agreement with the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits that “unpublished orders . . . may be considered
persuasive authority, but they do not constrain a panel of the court from reaching a
contrary conclusion in a published opinion after full consideration of the issue.” Id.
Although “nonprecedential” and “unpublished” can be used interchangeably, this Article
prefers the term “nonprecedential” given post–2001 publication of all opinions in West’s
Federal Appendix. See Federal Appendix (National Reporter System), THOMSON REUTERS,
http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/Reporters/Federal-AppendixNational-Reporter-System/p/100000796 [https://perma.cc/4HH6-Q9KY].
See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
See infra Subpart III.B and accompanying text.
See infra Subpart I.A and accompanying text.
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987). These settled adjudicative retroactivity
principles apply not merely to rules laid down by the Supreme Court but also to rules
laid down by courts of appeal, as all courts that have considered the issue agree. See

Nonprecedential Opinions

811

rule to litigants before it, the rule then applies to all similarly situated
litigants “as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or
postdate our announcement of the rule.”10 The Court has frequently
suggested that its approach is grounded in Article III and the separation of
powers.11 While unrelated doctrines like procedural default or qualified
immunity may operate to blunt or negate the benefit of a rule,12 and while a
subsequent court may recharacterize or abandon it,13 the doctrine of
adjudicative retroactivity creates—at a minimum—a duty to grapple with a
new rule ab initio.14 The Supreme Court has firmly resisted efforts to
undermine this core principle.15
At present, the system squeamishly tolerates the phenomenon of
nonprecedential opinions. In 2000, Eighth Circuit Judge Arnold issued a
shot-across-the-bow opinion in Anastasoff v. United States16 declaring
nonprecedential opinions unconstitutional. His opinion met firm resistance
in Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski’s point-counterpoint decision one year later
in Hart v. Massanari.17 Because the Eighth Circuit vacated Anastasoff on
other grounds as moot,18 the battle ended in stalemate and never reached the
Supreme Court. Judge Arnold cast his objection in fairly amorphous
constitutional terms, urging that failure to accord precedential effect to a
judicial decision violated the concept of “the judicial power” embedded in
Article III.19 Although Judge Kozinski disclaimed any content to “the
judicial power,” the bulk of his retort was practical: According precedential
force to every opinion would compel judges to divert resources from other

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Herman v. Héctor I. Nieves Transp., Inc., 244 F.3d 32, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2001); Laborers’
Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 386 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994)
(stating that there is “no cogent basis for distinguishing decisions handed down by the
inferior federal courts”); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Garrett, 6 F.3d
1547, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying circuit precedent retroactively after Harper).
Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
See infra notes 229–233 and accompanying text.
See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 200–204 and accompanying text.
See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243 (2011) (stating that under retroactivity “a
new rule is available on direct review as a potential ground for relief”).
See, e.g., Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 753–54 (1995) (rejecting a
litigant’s remedial argument because it would drain adjudicative retroactivity doctrine
of all but “symbolic significance”).
223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc).
266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001); see infra notes 90–100 and accompanying text (outlining
Judge Kozinski’s defense of nonprecedential opinions).
Anastasoff, 235 F.3d at 1056.
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900–03.
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opinions deserving full argument and reasoned analysis, leading to hasty,
even erroneous, opinions that could only be corrected by the cumbersome
en banc process20 or the (unlikely) grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court.
The debate between Judges Arnold and Kozinski ignited a firestorm of
commentary, much of it searching for a more precise constitutional
justification for Judge Arnold’s position or finding insurmountable practical
difficulty with anything other than Judge Kozinski’s position.21
In overlooking the interplay between nonprecedential opinions and the
Court’s already extant adjudicative retroactivity jurisprudence, this
commentary missed a fundamental, vexing problem. If clearly articulated
retroactivity doctrine requires that a new rule laid down on day one apply to
other pending cases, then a new rule laid down on day one that has no
application to any other litigants plainly offends. Adjudicative retroactivity
principles require that if a case’s rule goes beyond the application of clearly
settled law, then it must have precedential effect. Restricting other litigants’
access to the new rule creates an exception to adjudicative retroactivity
principles that is both unrecognized and doctrinally indefensible given the
largely unconstrained discretion courts exercise in deciding an opinion’s
precedential effect.22

20.
21.

22.

Hart, 266 F.3d at 1175–78.
See, e.g., Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of
Appeals, 29 VT. L. REV. 555, 583–91 (2005) (arguing that no-citation rules violate due
process); R. Ben Brown, Judging in the Days of the Early Republic: A Critique of Judge
Richard Arnold’s Use of History in Anastasoff v. United States, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
355, 382–83 (2001) (disputing Judge Arnold’s suggestion that doctrine of precedent was
a “background assumption” of the Framers); David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass:
Ending the Jurisprudentially Unsound Unpublication System, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 685,
701–10 (2009) (examining whether the practice of nonprecedential opinions comports
with procedural due process and equal protection); David Greenwald & Frederick A.O.
Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1133, 1159–66 (2002)
(contending that rules restricting citation violate the First Amendment); Martha
Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235,
1275 (2004) (criticizing the phenomenon of nonprecedential opinions as inconsistent
with the notion of precedent); Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a
Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; or Why the Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status
Rules Are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 955, 1018–31
(2009) (contending that nonprecedential opinions trench on a “thick” conception of
Article III power); Melissa H. Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision: An
Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 192–96 (2001) (examining
whether nonprecedential opinions comport with due process and equal protection).
See, e.g., Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 753–54 (rejecting the effort to
insert a balancing of factors into the remedial inquiry because it would drain the
adjudicative retroactivity doctrine of all but “symbolic significance”).
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That many opinions currently denominated as nonprecedential should
not be, however, does not mean that every opinion must have precedential
effect. Some opinions involve straightforward applications of existing rules
or standards to familiar fact patterns. Others break new ground. When an
opinion falls into the former category, a court may circumscribe its effect to
the instant litigants with impunity and need not expend resources that
distract from other more important cases. In that situation, the “rule” is by
definition then already retroactively available to all other litigants. As such,
restricting the effect of the decision is perfectly consistent with adjudicative
retroactivity principles, which require only decisions breaking new ground
to be precedential.
Some courts appear to have endorsed this approach, at least intuitively.
A handful of circuits have rules that require or encourage publication and
precedential effect when a case is “of first impression” or “alters, modifies, or
significantly clarifies” a preexisting rule.23 These rules are at times honored
in the breach. However, a clear majority of courts impose no such
publication requirements or restrictions, either making newness a mere
factor to consider or permitting panels to decide without apparent
constraint when an opinion merits precedential treatment.24
This Article endorses the instincts of the minority of courts and, for
clarity, suggests importing the “new law” construct that is already familiar
from Teague v. Lane25 in the habeas context and Harlow v. Fitzgerald26 in the
official immunity context.27 Where a rule is “new” or not “clearly settled”

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2); see also 1st CIR. LOC. R. 36.0(b)(1); 5th CIR. R. 47.5.1; 9th CIR. R. 36-2.
See, e.g., 4th CIR. LOC. R. 36(a) (making newness a mere factor to consider); 6th CIR.
I.O.P. 32.1(b) (same); 2d CIR. I.O.P. 32.1.1 (laying out no criteria to govern the
decision); 3d CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (same); 7th CIR. R. 32.1 (same); 8th CIR. R. 47B (same);
11th CIR. R. 36-2 (same); FED. CIR. R. 36 (permitting a nonprecedential opinion any
time the panel affirms).
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
457 U.S. 800 (1982).
This approach owes much to Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991). The article
examined the concept of “new law” in the different contexts of qualified immunity,
retroactivity in criminal cases, and governmental liability for the collection of
unconstitutional taxes. Fallon and Meltzer traced the concept of “new law” through its
various iterations in the law, thus tying disparate strands together and seeing it as a
unified approach best understood through the lens of remedy. Id. at 1733–38.
Recently, Professors Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt recognized that “the distinction
between a new rule and an application of an old one is already familiar to courts; whole
areas of law are built upon it.” Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active
Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109,
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within the meaning of our existing legal framework, it must emerge in a
precedential opinion. Where the rule is not “new” or is “clearly settled,” a
court may dispense with formal treatment and circumscribe the opinion’s
reach beyond the instant litigants. Part I examines the increasing
phenomenon of nonprecedential opinions, the Anastasoff-Hart debate, and
the practical difficulties with Judge Arnold’s “everything is precedential”
approach that inspired such divisive and vehement response. Part II
sketches out the Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence, concluding
that the Court has ultimately reached doctrinal equipoise by loosely tying
retroactivity to Article III and, in so doing, created a settled rule
necessitating justification for any contrary approach. Finally, Part III
analyzes nonprecedential opinions through an adjudicative retroactivity lens
and concludes that, to a significant degree, nonprecedential opinions are not
doctrinally defensible. It then examines the operation of a “clearly
established precedent” / “new rule” dividing line, already familiar in other
contexts, to ascertain what opinions may and may not be accorded
nonprecedential effect under existing doctrinal constraints.

I.
A.

THE DRAMATIC SURGE OF NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS

Post-1964 Explosion of the Phenomenon

Responding to a rapidly increasing workload, the Judicial Conference of
the United States first recommended that courts consider limiting the number
of published opinions to those of “general precedential value” in 1964.28
Within a decade, the practice had found general acceptance in every federal
circuit.29 The published opinion, “once the hallmark of the appellate courts’

28.

29.

2118 n.32 (2015). They offered that, if the doctrine is “workable and useful” in one
context, it may have utility in others. Id.
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 11
(1964) (hereinafter 1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT); see also Scott E. Gant, Missing
the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705, 708 (2006) (noting that movement toward
unpublished opinions “did not emerge until 1964”). Interestingly, the Judicial
Conference was motivated in part by the “practical difficulty and economic cost of
establishing and maintaining accessible private and public law library facilities . . . .”
1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 11. The Judicial Conference made no attempt to
define “general precedential value.” Id.
See Dione Christopher Greene, The Federal Courts of Appeals, Unpublished Decisions,
and the “No-Citation Rule”, 81 IND. L.J. 1503, 1503 (2006).
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work,”30 has been in retreat ever since. This is in part because the exploding
caseload of the federal courts has outpaced the number of judgeships, which
has held steady since 1990.31 The number of unpublished decisions has risen
dramatically,32 and statistics reflect that a scant 11.3 percent of federal
appellate court opinions were officially “published” in 2016.33
At first, the Judicial Conference permitted individual courts to develop
their own rules regarding publication, deciding whether to allow litigants to
cite to unpublished opinions and what precedential effect, if any, to accord
them.34 Before 2006, the circuit courts adopted rules generally barring
litigants from citing to unpublished opinions and restricting their
precedential value solely to the named litigants.35 In a pre-Internet world,
the phenomenon of unpublished opinions commanded little attention.
Opinions that courts did not publish were available only by visit to the
courthouse.36 Only the most enterprising (and well-funded) litigant was
likely to encounter an unpublished opinion, and rules limiting their use thus
engendered little controversy. But by 2001, with the rise in electronic

30.
31.

32.

33.

34.
35.

36.

Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for the Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal
Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (1995) (book
review).
Just under 4000 appeals were filed in 1960; over fourteen times that were filed in the federal
courts of appeals in 2016. Compare Will Shafroth, A Summary of the 1960 Report of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 47 A.B.A. J. 52, 54 (1961) (reporting 3900 cases
filed in courts of appeals in 1960), with U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile,
UNITED STATES COURTS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
fcms_na_appprofile1231.2016.pdf (reporting that 59,417 were cases filed in 2016).
Although proposals surface from time to time, Congress has not increased the number
of federal judgeships since 1990. See Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 202(a), 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2009)).
An analysis of nearly 400,000 cases between 1976 and 1997 demonstrated “a precipitous
drop in the proportion of publication rates up to the early 1980s, followed by a small rise
and ending with a steady decline post–1985.” John Szmer et al., The Efficiency of Federal
Appellate Decisions: An Examination of Published and Unpublished Opinions, 33 JUST. SYS.
J. 318, 325 (2012). This pattern was uniform across the circuits. Id.
U.S. Court of Appeals—Types of Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the
Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2016, UNITED
STATES COURTS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
jb_b12_0930.2016.pdf.
See Gant, supra note 28, at 709; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The NonPrecedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1978).
See, e.g., David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate
Over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1669–70 (2005) (noting that,
in most circuits, unpublished opinions “are consigned to a jurisprudential ‘Neverland,’
where litigants are either forbidden or discouraged from citing them”).
See Gant, supra note 28, at 709.
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databases and the print publication of West’s Federal Appendix, the term
“unpublished” opinion became a clear misnomer.37 Litigants could search
out factually analogous dispositions and find potentially beneficial legal
propositions online, so rules restricting citation and precedential effect
became more controversial.
In 2006, after years of debate,38 the Appellate Rules Advisory
Committee adopted Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which barred
federal courts from restricting or prohibiting citation to unpublished
opinions.39 Unpublished opinions became fair game. But the rule said
nothing about what precedential effect, if any, unpublished opinions would
have, leaving each court of appeals to develop its own rules.40 As of 2017,
every circuit has rules permitting litigants to cite to unpublished opinions,
but these rules specifically disclaim unpublished opinions’ precedential
effect.41 Thus, Rule 32.1 did little more than allow unpublished opinions out

37.
38.

39.
40.

41.

West’s Federal Appendix publishes the opinions of federal courts of appeal subsequent
to 2001 that are not selected by the court for publication in the Federal Reporter. See
FEDERAL APPENDIX (NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM), supra note 2.
Rule 32.1 presented “the most controversial issue in the history of the judicial rulemaking process.” Tony Mauro, Difference of Opinion: Should Judges Make More
Rulings Available as Precedent? How an Obscure Proposal is Dividing the Federal Bench,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004, at 10 (quoting Professor Patrick Schiltz, an Advisory
Committee reporter). Professor Schiltz, the hapless reporter, noted that he “devoted
more attention to the unpublished-opinions issue than to all of the other issues the
Advisory Committee has faced—combined” and joked that, on his death, “[his]
obituary would be unpublished.” Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining
the Sturm und Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1429, 1429–30 (2005).
See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a).
See Gant, supra note 28, at 724 (noting then-Judge Alito’s report that the rule affected
citation but not weight or precedential value); see also David R. Cleveland, Overturning
the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 62 (2009) (noting that questions of precedential effect “were
expressly avoided by the Committee”).
See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(e)(2) (an unpublished opinion means the panel sees “no
precedential value” in the disposition); 1st CIR. LOC. R. 32.1.0(a) (unpublished decisions have
persuasive value only); 2d CIR. I.O.P. 32.1.1(a) (same); 3d CIR. I.O.P. 5.1–5.3 (a panel may
designate an opinion as precedential or nonprecedential); 4th CIR. LOC. R. 32.1 (citation of
unpublished opinions is disfavored except for purposes of res judicata, estoppel, or law of the
case); 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4 (unpublished decisions issued on or after January 1, 1996 are nonprecedential); 6th CIR. R. 32.1(a) (only published decisions are binding on subsequent
panels); 7th CIR. R. 32.1 (unpublished opinions “are not treated as precedents”); 8th CIR.
R. 32.1A (unpublished opinions “are not precedent”); 9th CIR. R. 36-3(a) (same); 10th
CIR. R. 32.1(A) (unpublished opinions may be cited “for their persuasive value”); 11th CIR. R.
36-2 (unpublished opinions “are not considered binding precedent”); FED. CIR. R. 32.1(d)
(unpublished opinions are suitable “for guidance or persuasive reasoning” but are not
given binding effect).
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from under their rock. If anything, by abandoning the pretense that litigants
were simply barred from citing to unpublished opinions (a pretense that
enabled courts to avoid answering the question of precedential effect
directly), the new rule obliged courts to be more forthright about the
inapplicability of nonprecedential opinions to the universe of other potential
litigants.
Proponents justify the rise in unpublished opinions out of concern for
efficiency.42 With too many cases allocated amongst too few judges, panels
are hard-pressed to devote the time, energy, and care necessary to craft a
thorough, well-reasoned opinion in each and every case.43 Data confirm that
published decisions are more time consuming.44 Published decisions require
more of courts; as Judge Kozinski observed, judges writing a precedential
decision must choose carefully amongst alternative formulations of the rule and
provide explanations both for the choices they make and for their rejection of
alternate paths.45 The court must address itself not only to the facts at hand but
also to the many possible permutations it might face in the future. In
committing its reasoning to published form, the court “sets the course of the
law for hundreds or thousands of litigants and potential litigants.”46
Added to the burden of writing such a thoroughly conceived opinion is
the consequence of committing to it. A circuit court panel decision binds all
subsequent panels and cannot be overruled by a subsequent panel,
notwithstanding concern that it may misperceive the law or result in an
unworkable standard.47 Generally, the only way a circuit court can “right” a
panel’s misstep is by convening an en banc hearing, an exceedingly rare and
42.

43.
44.

45.
46.
47.

See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 190–
91 (1999) (arguing that unpublished opinions enhance judicial productivity and
prevent depreciation in the quality of published opinions); Erica S. Weisgerber, Note,
Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L.J.
621, 625 (2009) (citing time pressure, increasing caseloads, and the need for legal clarity
as efficiency-based justifications for the dramatic rise in the unpublished opinion
phenomenon).
See Martin, supra note 42, at 182–83 (noting the dramatic expansion in the Sixth
Circuit’s workload since the author, a Sixth Circuit judge, had himself clerked on that
court).
Szmer et al., supra note 32, at 325. The Szmer study found that “[p]ublished cases, on
average, take seven weeks longer to dispose of than unpublished cases . . . .” Id. at 330.
Judge Kozinski wrote perhaps the most impassioned defense of the practice of
unpublished nonprecedential opinions in Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.
2001). When done right, he noted, writing a published opinion “is an exacting and
extremely time-consuming task.” Id. at 1177.
Hart, 266 F.3d at 1176–77.
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1171–72.
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increasingly infrequent occurrence.48 Practically speaking, then, the draw of
the unpublished opinion is twofold: Precedential opinions cost too much in
that they take too much judicial time and energy, and at the same time, they
impair flexibility by binding all other panels, constraining colleagues or at
least creating additional work for everyone through the seldom-invoked en
banc process.49

48.

49.

See Aaron S. Bayer, En Banc Review Has Declined in the Past Decade, NAT. L.J., May 9,
2011, at 1 (noting a steep downward trend in en banc review across the circuits). A
study by the New York Law Journal found that, in the five-year period from 2011–2016,
the circuit courts of appeal had heard a total of only 145 cases en banc, with seven
circuits hearing fewer than ten cases en banc during this five-year period. See Martin
Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, The Rarity of En Banc Review in the Second Circuit, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 24, 2016, at 2. Several circuits have adopted a mechanism for informal en
banc review. See generally Alexandra Sadinsky, Note, Redefining En Banc Review in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2024–29 (2014) (describing nine
circuits’ adoption of the technique). The D.C. Circuit, for example, uses a mechanism
called “the Irons footnote,” after Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir.
1981), by which a panel may obtain the endorsement of the en banc court for a
proposition that does not merit full hearing. But this mechanism is largely limited to
situations where prior D.C. Circuit decisions conflict or have been rendered obsolete.
See Policy Statement on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions (Jan. 17, 1996),
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/650f3eec0dfb990fca25692100069854/
a4f637b0b7081fa0852573d8005fbc67/$FILE/IRONS.PDF.
Despite its pragmatic appeal, the tidal wave of nonprecedential opinions has met
considerable criticism in the academy. Balanced against the costs and inconvenience of
creating precedential opinions are the “vital functions” precedential opinions play in
our system. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273,
282 (1996). Professors Richman and Reynolds found that precedential opinions foster
quality, predictability, and accountability and permit mechanisms for additional
review. See id. at 282–86. They argue that the phenomenon of nonprecedential
opinions as well as other mechanisms like dispensing with oral argument and farming
out judicial and quasi-judicial tasks to an ever-growing bureaucracy has effectively
given rise to a “new certiorari,” whereby courts of appeal sift through the sea of appeals
to select cases deserving of plenary review. See id. at 293–94; see also William M.
Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1723, 1731
(2005) (“Without statutory authority, [appellate courts] have transformed themselves
from courts of mandatory jurisdiction (whose primary function is error correction)
into de facto certiorari courts, taking only those cases suitable for making law.”).
Professors Vladeck and Gulati call the increased phenomenon of “black box” cases
disposed of in brief, unpublished, unsigned, and nonprecedential opinions “a stain on
our appellate justice system.” Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 35, at 1670–71. Among
other things, they note that unpublished opinions are more likely to be insulated from
en banc and Supreme Court review, thus removing a valuable check on judicial power.
See id. at 1680–81. Judge Patricia Wald begrudgingly accepted the existence of
nonprecedential opinions but noted that she had seen colleagues on the D.C. Circuit
“purposely compromise on an unpublished opinion” on occasion in an effort to “sweep
troublesome issues under the rug.” Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the
Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995).
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Nonprecedential Opinions Can Break New Ground

It is useful, at this point, to be precise about what exactly
nonprecedential opinions look like and what factors may incline a court to
craft a nonprecedential opinion. After all, if the nonprecedential opinion is
merely an application of settled law, the case says nothing new by definition.
Under these circumstances, the applicable rule is already available to
prospective litigants, and the “nonprecedential” aspect of the case is almost
circular: Having said nothing, the opinion by very definition has no utility as
a precedent.
Each of the circuit courts of appeal has rules or internal procedures to
govern when a panel may opt to issue a nonprecedential opinion,50 and these
rules vary widely. Four circuits’ rules require that panels publish an opinion
if it “alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a rule of law,”51 but these
standards are loosely defined and generally permit nonpublication of
opinions that draw dissents.52 Two other circuit courts make novelty of the
rule a mere factor to consider.53 Six other courts give panels free rein to
designate any opinion as nonprecedential that they believe should lack
precedential effect.54 The universe of nonprecedential opinions undoubtedly
includes cases that do not stake out new ground; however, only a handful of
circuits have rules that specifically restrict nonprecedential opinions to these
cases, and even circuits with stricter rules permit panels to accord
nonprecedential effect to opinions that lack unanimity.55

50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.

See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2); 1ST CIR. R. LOC. R. 36.0(b)(1); 2D CIR. I.O.P. 32.1.1(a); 3D CIR.
I.O.P. 5.3; 4TH CIR. LOC. R. 36(a); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1; 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 32.1(b); 7TH CIR. R.
32.1; 8TH CIR. R. 47B; 9TH CIR. R. 36-2; 10TH CIR. R. 36.1; 11TH CIR. R. 36-2; FED. CIR. R. 36.
D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2)(B). See, e.g.,1ST CIR. LOC. R. 36.0(b)(1); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1; 9TH
CIR. R. 36-2.
See D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2) (excluding opinions that draw dissents from the list of criteria
that, if met, requires publishing an opinion); 1ST CIR. LOC. R. 36(b)(1) (preferring that
opinions be published but noting that policy can be overcome when the opinion does
not “serve otherwise as a significant guide to future litigants”); 10TH CIR. R. 36.1
(requiring publication in the event of separate opinions); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 (allowing
that an opinion “may” be published if it is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting
opinion); 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(g) (requiring publication if a dissenting or concurring judge
specifically requests it).
See, e.g., 4TH CIR. LOC. R. 36(a); 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 32.1(b)(1)(A).
See, e.g., 2D CIR. I.O.P. 32.1.1; 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.3; 7TH CIR. R. 32.1; 8TH CIR. R. 47B; 11TH
CIR. R. 36-2; FED. CIR. R. 36.
See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 (permitting but not requiring publication in the event of a
dissenting or concurring opinion); 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(g) (requiring publication of a
fractured decision only if the dissenting or concurring judge specifically requests it).
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In practice, the majority of circuits permit nonprecedential opinions in
a broad swath of situations that may break new ground. Nonprecedential
decisions frequently include dissents,56 even in circuits whose rules specify
that an opinion “shall be designated” precedential if it alters, modifies, or
clarifies existing law.57 In a 2001 study, Professors Deborah Merritt and
James Brudney found that, rather than consisting of “routine applications of
existing law with which all judges would agree,” nonprecedential decisions
included “a noticeable number” of reversals, dissents, and concurrences.58
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review numerous unpublished
decisions, even recently, and often has reversed.59 In several cases, the

56.

57.

58.

59.

See, e.g., United States v. White, 683 F. App’x 549 (8th Cir. 2017) (affirming over Judge
Loken’s dissent); United States v. Meraz-Olivera, 472 F. App’x 610, 612 (9th Cir. 2012)
(affirming over Judge Reinhardt’s dissent urging a due process violation); United States
v. Turnage, 222 F. App’x 251 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming over Judge Motz’s dissent);
Access for Am., Inc. v. Associated Out-Door Clubs, Inc., 188 F. App’x 818, 820 (11th
Cir. 2006) (affirming over Judge Barkett’s dissent arguing that the panel’s opinion was
inconsistent with prior Eleventh Circuit precedent); U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. v. Sw. Bell
Mobile Sys., Inc., 124 F.3d 218 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming over Judge Baldock’s
dissent). See generally Gant, supra note 28, at 729 & n.115 (emphasizing that many
unpublished opinions contain dissents and do not merely unanimously affirm lower
court holdings).
See, e.g., In re Martin, 398 F. App’x 326 (10th Cir. 2010) (denying authorization for
successive habeas petition over Judge Hartz’s dissent); Bias v. Woods, 288 F. App’x 158
(5th Cir. 2008) (finding that a physician acted with deliberate indifference over Judge
Owen’s dissent); United States v. Novosel, 139 F. App’x 985 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
a sentencing challenge over Judge Briscoe’s dissent); Singh v. Ashcroft, 87 F. App’x 69
(9th Cir. 2004) (granting an asylum petition over Judge Beam’s dissent).
Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 120 (2001).
Further belying the notion that unpublished decisions were straightforward
applications of settled legal principles, Professors Merritt and Brudney also found that
judges with different backgrounds and demographic profiles reached different results.
See id. at 110–11.
See, e.g., McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017) (reversing an unpublished
Eleventh Circuit decision, McWilliams v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of
Corrections, 634 F. App’x 689 (11th Cir. 2015), granting a habeas petition in a capital
case); Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015) (reversing an unpublished Fifth Circuit
decision, Mata v. Holder, 588 F. App’x 366 (5th Cir. 2014)); Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.
Ct. 1911 (2013) (vacating an unpublished Fifth Circuit decision, Trevino v. Thaler, 449
F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2011)); Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007) (reversing a
criminal conviction affirmed in an unpublished Fifth Circuit decision, United States v.
Watson, 191 F. App’x 326 (5th Cir. 2006)); Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609,
612 (2007) (reversing an unpublished Ninth Circuit decision, Rettele v. Los Angeles
County, 186 F. App’x 765 (9th Cir. 2006)); Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 265
(1998) (reversing an unpublished Federal Circuit decision, King v. McManus, 92 F.3d
1208 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Terrell v. Morris, 493 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (vacating an unpublished
Sixth Circuit decision, Terrell v. Marshall, 872 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1989)); C.I.R. v.
McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (“We note in passing that the fact that the Court of
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Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split where one of
the decisions was an unpublished opinion.60 For example, an indignant
Supreme Court in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. deemed it
“remarkable and unusual” that a divided Fourth Circuit panel had
invalidated an Act of the U.S. Congress in an unpublished and unsigned
opinion.61 In Los Angeles County v. Rettele, Justice Stevens noted in his
concurrence in the judgment that the case raised two questions, and “[t]he
fact that the judges on the Court of Appeals disagreed on both questions
convinces me that they should not have announced their decision in an
unpublished opinion.”62
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Syncor International Corp. v.
McLeland63 provides an illustrative example of an unpublished decision that
breaks new ground. Syncor involved an employer’s effort to enforce an ex parte
arbitration order against a former employee, David McLeland.64 While prior
Fourth Circuit precedent required a court to overturn an arbitrator’s order
only where it manifestly disregarded existing law,65 the arbitration
agreement at issue provided that “[t]he arbitrator shall not have the power to
commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or
corrected by judicial review for any such error.”66 In other words, precedent

60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Appeals’ order under challenge here is unpublished carries no weight in our decision to
review the case.”) (reversing an unpublished Sixth Circuit decision); Burlington N. R.R.
Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 460 (1987) (reversing after noting that an
unpublished Tenth Circuit opinion below had created a conflict with the Eighth
Circuit); County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 936, 938 n.2 (1985) (reversing
an unpublished Ninth Circuit order that was unpublished at the time certiorari was
filed, Kling v. Los Angeles County, 769 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1985)); McDonald v. City of
West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 285 (1984) (reversing an unpublished Sixth Circuit
decision, McDonald v. City of West Branch, 709 F.2d 1505 (6th Cir. 1983)); Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 6–7 (1980) (reversing a Seventh Circuit unpublished order, Hughes v.
Rowe, 605 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1979), “dispos[ing] of the novel question presented by
petitioner”).
See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583 n.5 (2008) (noting there was
an unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion on one side of the split); Johnson v. United
States, 529 U.S. 694, 699 n.3 (2000) (noting there was an unpublished First Circuit
opinion on one side of the split); see also Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828, 830–31
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (observing that an unpublished
Fourth Circuit opinion had deepened an existing circuit split).
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 n.3 (1993).
Rettele, 550 U.S. at 616 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997).
See id. at *2–3.
See id. at *5–6 (citing Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 31,
933 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1991)).
Id. at *6 (joint appendix citation omitted).
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allowed the court to intervene only when the arbitrator had disregarded existing
law, but the agreement sought to allow intervention in circumstances beyond
mere disregard. McLeland argued that, given this contractual language, the
district court ought to have reviewed the arbitrator’s award de novo.67
Having no precedent on point, the Fourth Circuit looked to an analogous
Fifth Circuit opinion and ultimately agreed with McLeland’s argument.68
This conclusion, novel in the Fourth Circuit, was not unassailable, and
ultimately, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits reached opposite conclusions,
holding that parties could not contract for expanded judicial review under
the Federal Arbitration Act.69 The Supreme Court settled the split
amongst circuits in Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., rejecting the
Fourth Circuit’s conclusion and siding with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.70
Amid the 88.7 percent of the work of the federal courts of appeals that
is currently unpublished and thus nonprecedential, it is beyond question
that there are opinions that state new legal principles or seemingly draw
controversial conclusions.
C.

Judicial Point-Counterpoint on the Practice

Against this backdrop, Judge Richard Arnold, writing for a unanimous
Eighth Circuit panel, shook things up in August 2000.71 In Anastasoff v.
United States, appellant Faye Anastasoff sought a refund for overpayment of
federal taxes. Her refund claim, postmarked within the three-year limitations
period, was received three years and one day after her overpayment.72 After the
IRS denied her refund because she had paid the taxes more than three years
before her claim, Anastasoff argued that the federal “mailbox rule,”73 under
which a claim is validly filed as of the postmark date, should operate to permit
the refund. But Anastasoff faced an unfavorable prior opinion: Christie v.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.

See id. at *5–6.
See id. at *6–7 (citing Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993,
996–97 (5th Cir. 1995).
See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001).
See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590–91 (2008).
The Supreme Court had previously punted on this issue, finding that, in light of its
disposition of a case, it could “leave . . . to another day” petitioner’s challenge to rules
limiting citation to unpublished opinions. Browder v. Dir., Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S.
257, 258 n.1 (1978).
See 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds as moot, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000).
See 26 U.S.C. § 7502 (2012).
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United States, a prior unpublished Eighth Circuit opinion, had rejected
precisely this argument about the mailbox rule.74 Anastasoff urged the court
to ignore Christie, arguing that since it was unpublished pursuant to Eighth
Circuit Rule 28A(i), the unpublished Christie rule lacked precedential
effect.75
The Anastasoff panel disagreed, concluding that the portion of Rule
28A(i) that stripped Christie of precedential effect violated Article III.76
Citing Sir Edward Coke and Sir Matthew Hale, Judge Arnold observed that
the nature of “the judicial power” is to decide cases and, in so doing, to
declare the law.77 Judge Arnold saw the obligation to adhere to precedent as
a necessary limitation on the judicial function, preventing judges from
exercising purely discretionary authority and keeping them within their proper
judicial roles. Per Judge Arnold, the obligation to adhere to precedent
“derive[d] from the nature of the judicial power itself,” separating it “from a
dangerous union with the legislative power.”78 The system of precedent kept
judges within the boundaries of their prescribed function and, in so doing,
safeguarded liberty.79 Judge Arnold clarified, though, that he was not
suggesting that the system contemplated blind, unyielding adherence to
precedent: At times a court might overrule a prior decision, but the system
of precedent envisioned by the Framers—so important to the separation of
powers—created “a burden of justification” in doing so.80
Judge Arnold soundly rejected the argument that nonprecedential
opinions were a necessary evil.81 If “[w]e do not have time to do a decent
enough job,” he reasoned, “the remedy is not to create an underground body
of law good for one place and time only.”82 The answer was either to create

74.
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375NM, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir.
Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished). In its possible utility in the Anastasoff case,
Christie is obviously an unpublished decision that broke new ground.
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
Id. at 899–901.
Id. (citing Sir Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 51
(1642) and Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 44–45 (U.
Chi. ed., 1971)); see also Johanna S. Schiavoni, Comment, Who’s Afraid of Precedent?:
The Debate Over the Precedential Value of Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1859, 1868–70 (2002) (analyzing separation of powers and judicial function as
rationales for the panel’s decision).
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903.
Id.at 901–03.
Id. at 904–05.
Id. at 904.
Id.
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more judgeships “or, if that is not practical, for each judge to take enough
time to do a competent job with each case.”83
After the August issuance of the panel decision, Anastasoff filed a
petition for rehearing en banc. During the pendency of her petition, the
United States paid Anastasoff’s tax refund claim in full. The en banc court,
again per Judge Arnold, concluded that the government’s actions had
mooted the case and vacated the panel’s decision regarding the question of
nonprecedential opinions, despite the issue’s “great interest and
importance.”84
The following year, Hart v. Massanari,85 a unanimous Ninth Circuit
decision authored by Judge Kozinski, staked out a contrary position. In
Hart, appellant Patricia Hart had cited to an unpublished disposition, Rice v.
Chater,86 in a footnote in her opening brief despite then-prevailing Ninth
Circuit Rule 36-3 barring citation to unpublished decisions. The Ninth Circuit
invited counsel to show cause why he should not face discipline for violating
the rule, and counsel responded that Rule 36-3 violated the Constitution.87 The
panel noted that Anastasoff, though vacated as moot, “continues to have
persuasive force” and “may seduce members of our bar into violating Rule
36-3 . . . .”88 The panel wrote “to lay these speculations to rest.”89
Judge Kozinski rejected the premise that rules permitting nonprecedential
opinions were inconsistent with the judicial function and, indeed, disclaimed
the notion that “the judicial Power” in Article III had any independent
content at all: “The judicial power clause . . . has never before been thought to
encompass a constitutional limitation on how courts conduct their
business.”90 Citing Professor Henry Hart’s famous Dialogue, Judge Kozinski

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.
90.

Id.
Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000).
266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
No. 95-35604, 1996 WL 583605 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 1996).
Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159.
Id. Certainly, despite the withdrawal of Anastasoff, the issue continued to percolate. In
Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), three
Fifth Circuit judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc because the case would
have permitted the court to consider the question of unpublished decisions and their
precedential effect.
Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159.
Id. at 1160. Judge Kozinski’s conclusion is not unassailable here. Even setting aside the
retroactivity cases, the political question doctrine has at its roots a conception of the
judicial function, as captured in Article III and as distinguished from the functions of
coordinate branches. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189,
202 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(observing that the political question doctrine is a function of separation of powers and
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contended that, because “Congress could abolish the inferior federal courts”
entirely, there were very few, if any, constitutional imperatives
circumscribing the business of the lower courts.91 Judge Kozinski only
found limits in the “case or controversies” requirement and in the side
constraints of due process and the Seventh Amendment; to him, “the
judicial power” in itself was simply descriptive, not prescriptive.92 Rejecting
any reading of “the judicial power” that might freeze outmoded practices in
place, Judge Kozinski recited several examples of practices that had gone by
the wayside, like appellate judges each writing an opinion in every case and
judges participating in the appeals of their own decisions.93
Judge Kozinski likewise dismissed the notion that the Framers had
envisioned a robust system of precedent, noting that the Framers lived in a
Blackstonian universe in which judges “found” rather than “made” the law
and reporters were few and far between.94 The common law system, he
reasoned, was inherently flexible and allowed judges to respond to changed
circumstances. The modern concept of precedent, he noted, was largely a
creature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and thus the publication
of a judicial decision necessarily played no part in the Framers’ calculus in
crafting Article III.95 To early Americans, in Judge Kozinski’s view, prior
cases had the effect of persuasive, not binding, authority.96 Whether to
follow a particular case or line of cases was a policy judgment, and many of
the facets of our current system were simply “a matter of judicial
administration.”97

91.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.
97.

derived from Article III); Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the
Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 113 & n.141 (2000) (citing the political question doctrine
and Marbury itself as reflecting interpretations of the “judicial power” that
circumscribe what courts can and cannot do).
Hart, 266 F.3d at 1161–62 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363–64
(1953)).
See id. at 1161.
See id. at 1162.
See id. at 1167–68; see also Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Note, Precedent, Judicial Power,
and the Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1037, 1046 (2002) (noting Judge Kozinski’s position that, to common law
judges, opinions were merely examples and evidence of the law).
See Hart, 266 F.3d at 1168–69.
See id. at 1175.
See id. at 1175–76 (listing strict binding authority, the circuit court system, and circuit
boundaries as examples of judicial administration rather than constitutional law or
imperative).
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Having dispensed with any constitutional basis to bar nonprecedential
opinions, Judge Kozinski moved to an impassioned defense of their
necessity. He forthrightly differentiated the work entailed in a precedential
opinion—with its anticipation of various permutations, its thoughtful
development of the legal principle, and its thorough treatment of prior
precedential cases—from the work anticipated in a nonprecedential opinion,
which need not be written in a way “fully intelligible to those unfamiliar
with the case.”98 An unpublished decision, in Judge Kozinski’s estimation,
was “more or less, a letter from the court to parties familiar with the facts,
announcing the result and the essential rationale of the court’s decision.”99
Judge Kozinski observed that, given the staggering workload of the federal
courts, judges lacked time, energy, and resources to give precedential
treatment to the innumerable appeals that presented themselves.100 In effect,
the power to issue nonprecedential opinions and orders was a power
exercised by necessity. To create legal principles worth enforcing, the court
simply had to pick and choose.
At day’s end, then, Judges Arnold and Kozinski manifested sharp
differences on whether Article III’s allocation of “the judicial power” to the
federal courts restrained writing nonprecedential opinions or indeed, had
any content at all. The Federal Circuit joined the Ninth the following year,
citing the “comprehensive, scholarly treatment of the issue” in Hart.101
Given the withdrawal of the Eighth Circuit opinion, the stalemate has left
nonprecedential opinions intact in every court of appeals, an outcome
frequently lamented but invariably perceived as a necessary evil. As noted,
the phenomenon has increased sharply over time.

II.

ADJUDICATIVE RETROACTIVITY AND THE DUTY TO GRAPPLE

Surprisingly unnoticed in the debate on published and precedential
opinions has been the Supreme Court’s doctrine of adjudicative retroactivity,
which has evolved from a blurry and vacillating compromise to a well-defined,
decades-old doctrine. The doctrine affects—indeed, resolves—the debate here,
but to understand the application of adjudicative retroactivity to this debate, it
is necessary to understand the context in which the doctrine emerged and
the ideas that it rejected.

98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 1177–78.
Id. at 1178.
Id.
Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Nonprecedential Opinions

A.

827

The Substrate: Linkletter and Chevron Oil

The doctrine of adjudicative retroactivity has followed the serpentine
path typical of many federal jurisdiction doctrines over the past few decades.
Until the early 1960s, the generally accepted view was that all Supreme
Court decisions were given full retroactive effect, at least within the
permissible boundaries of res judicata and final criminal convictions.102 As a
remedy, habeas was not very expansive,103 and the key protections for
criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights had yet to be incorporated by way
of the Due Process Clause to bind the states.104 Therefore, the doctrine
imposed few systemic burdens with its requirement that all litigants got the
benefit of the most current rule, even if the Court had handed down that
rule long after initiation of their lawsuit.105

102. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 106 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia cited Justice Holmes for the proposition that “[j]udicial decisions have
had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.” Id. (citing Kuhn v. Fairmont
Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also John Bernard Corr,
Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine “As Applied”, 61 N.C. L. REV. 745, 746
(1983) (noting that retroactivity was presumed under common law).
103. Not until 1867 did Congress even confer on the federal courts the authority to grant
habeas relief to state prisoners. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255 (2012)).
104. As far as criminal defendants go, the bulk of incorporation occurred in the 1960s. See,
e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (extending the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(extending the Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures to the states).
105. The seminal case on point was the old chestnut The Schooner Peggy from 1801, in
which Chief Justice Marshall observed:
It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to enquire
whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if subsequent to the
judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation
denied. If the law be constitutional, and of that no doubt in the present case has
been expressed, I know of no court which can contest its obligation.

United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801). Chief Justice Marshall wrote
specifically about treaties, and he cautioned that the rule might be different where
private parties were concerned. Id. But over the next century, the retroactive
application of judicial decisions in all civil and criminal cases found general—and
unchallenged—acceptance. So settled was retroactivity that in Vandenbark v. OwensIllinois Glass Co., the Court observed that “the dominant principle” is that courts
“should conform their orders to the state law as of the time of the entry. Intervening
and conflicting decisions will thus cause the reversal of judgments which were correct
when entered.” Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co,. 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941).

828

65 UCLA L. R EV. 808 (2018)

Beneath the Court’s notion of retroactivity lurked a Blackstonian
understanding of the judicial function that some commentators, at least,
believed crucial to the courts’ power and legitimacy:106 Judges were not
lawmakers; instead they declared legal principles that were already in
existence.107 Because the rules described in any given case predated that case
in some metaphysical sense, it worked no offense to anyone to apply them
broadly to other, similarly situated litigants.108 Thus, the rule declared in any
case “was not ‘new law but an application of what is, and theretofore had
been, the true law.’”109
Then came the Warren Court, which ushered in dramatic, sweeping
changes in the conception of federal judicial power and with them, decisive
movement away from the Blackstonian orthodoxy. Significant to this
discussion, the Warren Court greatly expanded the protections of the Bill of
Rights and incorporated these new protections into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause so that they were equally binding against
the states.110 At the same time, cases like Brown v. Allen111 and Fay v. Noia112
broadened the substantive scope of habeas corpus so that it became an
indispensable step in the process for virtually every criminal defendant.113

106. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due
Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62 (1965) (“Despite (and perhaps also
because of) its shortcomings as a description of reality, the ‘declaratory theory’
expresses a symbolic concept of the judicial process on which much of courts’ prestige
and power depend.” (footnote omitted)).
107. See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, With Thoughts for the Future:
What the Supreme Court Learned From Paul Mishkin, and What It Might, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 1677, 1680–81 (2007). William Blackstone said that, when courts issue a decision
that departs from prior law, “even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend
to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be
found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that
such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law . . . .” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 69–70 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765).
108. See Mishkin, supra note 106, at 56–59.
109. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 (1965) (quoting Harry Shulman, Retroactive
Legislation, 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOC. SCIS. 355, 356 (1934)). Kermit Roosevelt notes that
“[t]he consequence of this idea of law as an apotheosized immutable is that the concept
of retroactivity has no place; ‘old law’ and ‘new law’ are necessarily the same.” Kermit
Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative
Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1083 (1999).
110. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6–7
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963).
111. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
112. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
113. Brown established the principle that decisions of state courts were not res judicata and
could be reconsidered by federal courts on habeas. 344 U.S. at 457–59. Fay permitted
habeas petitioners to raise issues that they had not presented at trial, provided they had
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The Court’s approach to rights-creation during this activist era was
frequently more legislative than judicial, and in this environment,
“Blackstone’s notion that a court’s duty is not to ‘pronounce a new law, but
to maintain and expound the old one,’ could only have seemed quaint.”114
In conjunction with its expansion of constitutional rights and the
habeas remedy, the Court took a fresh look at the doctrine of retroactivity.
In Linkletter v. Walker,115 the Court held that the Constitution permitted it
to limit the retroactive application of its decisions in recognition of their
possible disruptive systemic effects.116 Linkletter addressed the applicability
of Mapp v. Ohio’s exclusionary rule to an already-finalized case. Faced with
the prospect of reversing thousands of state convictions procured using
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court decided
that, in fact, Mapp could apply to the defendant in that case and otherwise
have prospective effect only.117 Although Linkletter arose in the context of a
habeas proceeding, the Court did not limit its discussion of retroactivity and
prospectivity by means of a “habeas is different” argument. Instead, the
Court created a balancing test that examined “the prior history of the rule in
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation
[would] further or retard its operation.”118
Two years later, in Stovall v. Denno,119 the Court expressly grappled
with, and rejected, the possible unfairness of selective prospectivity. Two
other cases, issued the same day as Stovall, had held that criminal defendants
appealing on direct review had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for
post-indictment lineups.120 In Stovall, the Court rejected retroactive

114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
120.

not deliberately decided to bypass available state procedures in an effort to manipulate.
372 U.S. at 433–35.
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 27, at 1739 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 107, at 69)
(footnote omitted).
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Id. at 627–29.
Id. at 636–41; see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium
Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (1997) (noting that nonretroactivity was
initially an attempt to minimize the impact of Warren Court decisions and avoid the
systemic disruption of freeing defendants convicted under prior legal standards);
Roosevelt, supra note 109, at 1078–79 (observing the Court’s shift from what the law
was at the time of the decision to what it was in effect at the time of actions underlying
the lawsuit).
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–38 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263, 271–72 (1967).
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application of this new rule due to the states’ reliance on the prior rule.121
Acknowledging that petitioners in the other cases had received the benefit of
the new rule and that some might see this as inequitable, the Court decided
that the creation of “chance beneficiaries” was an unavoidable consequence
of Article III’s command that the Court decide concrete cases in an
adversarial posture.122
The Court’s early and unanimous acceptance of selective prospectivity
emerged from two very different impulses.123 Conservatives, reluctant to
give broad compass to rules laid out by the Warren Court majority, initially
sought to mitigate damages by restricting the scope of rules they
disfavored.124 At the other end of the spectrum, prospectivity allowed an
activist Court to blunt the considerable costs of its actions, permitting the
Court to find new protections under the law without massive systemic
impact.125 This, in turn, curbed the hue and cry that might result from a
change in the rules and gave the Court a measure of institutional
protection.126
This period marked a sea-change in the Court’s
121. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 299–301. Although Mr. Stovall was a habeas petitioner whose
conviction had already become final, again the Court deemed the posture of the case
irrelevant, holding the rule nonretroactive even as to cases still pending on direct. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 27, at 1739–40.
124. See id. In Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
Justice Harlan admitted in dissent that, although he had initially joined the Court’s
decisions denying retroactive effect, “I did so because I thought it important to limit the
impact of constitutional decisions which seemed to me profoundly unsound in
principle.” See also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Some members of the
Court, and I have come to regret that I was among them, initially grasped
[retroactivity] doctrine as a way of limiting the reach of decisions that seemed to them
fundamentally unsound.”).
125. See Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J.
922, 974 (2006) (footnote omitted) (observing that “the lure of making new decisions
less than fully retroactive proved impossible to resist, both for Justices anxious to contain
the harms of what they saw as badly flawed decisions and those wanting to ensure that
‘long[]overdue reforms’ would not be inhibited” (quoting Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S.
213, 218 (1969)). For example, Fallon and Meltzer note that “[i]t was much easier for
the Court to lay down the Miranda rules, for example, knowing that the prison doors
need not necessarily swing open for every inmate convicted with the aid of confessions
not preceded by the requisite warnings.” Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 27, at 1739.
126. As Chief Justice Warren candidly observed, the technique of selective prospectivity had
its “impetus” in the need for “the implementation of long overdue reforms, which
otherwise could not be practicably effected.” Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 218. Mishkin noted
that a contrary rule mandating retroactivity “would seem to operate as an ‘inherent
restraint’ on judicial lawmaking because it compels the Court to confront in sharpest
form the possible undesirable consequences of adopting a new rule . . . .” Mishkin,
supra note 106, at 70; see also Pamela J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine:
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understanding of the judicial function, with the Warren Court forthrightly
acknowledging that its rules broke new ground.127 Armed with this
understanding of old and new rules, the Linkletter and Stovall Courts found
no constitutional impediment to a court’s decision, “in the interest of
justice,” to occasionally make a new rule solely prospective.128
A flexible approach to retroactivity in the civil context soon followed
suit. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,129 a statute of limitations case, the Court
crafted a similar balancing test that took into account reliance interests and
potential for disruption.130 The plaintiff had relied on a federal maritime
doctrine of laches in filing suit and let the one-year state statute of
limitations lapse.131 During the lower court litigation, a Supreme Court
decision in another case established that the state—not the federal—statute
of limitations governed.132 The Chevron Oil Court decided that it would be
unfair to give its intervening decision retroactive effect.133 The Court
balanced the weightiness of the “new principle of law,” the “prior history of
the rule in question,” and the possible “inequit[ies] imposed by retroactive
application.”134 On the facts before it, the Court found that the unfairness of
giving effect to this unforeseeable change in the law mandated prospective
application of the new rule.135

127.

128.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Equality, Reliance and Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515, 1521 (1998) (citing
Mishkin’s conclusion that nonretroactivity “made it easier for the Warren Court to
make sweeping changes in constitutional doctrine without having to face the
consequences in the form of serious disruptions of the criminal justice system”). To
Mishkin, the restraint was optimal, particularly given an Article III judge’s insulation
from the political process. Mishkin, supra note 106, at 72.
Professor Mishkin argued that “[p]rospective limitation of judicial decisions wars with”
what he described as “the strongly held and deeply felt belief that judges are bound by a
body of fixed, overriding law, that they apply that law impersonally as well as
impartially, that they exercise no individual choice and have no program of their own
to advance.” Mishkin, supra note 106, at 62, 64.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627–28 (1965). As Justice Souter noted for the
Court in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536 (1991) (plurality
opinion), this approach “tends to relax the force of precedent, by minimizing the costs
of overruling, and thereby allows the courts to act with a freedom comparable to that of
legislatures.”
404 U.S. 97 (1971).
Id. at 105–07.
Id. at 98–99, 105.
Id. at 99 (citing Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 365–66 (1969)).
Id. at 107–08.
Id. at 106–07.
Id. at 109.
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Movement to Retroactivity in the Criminal Context

Over time, however, the tenuous consensus on prospectivity fractured.
In Desist v. United States136 and Mackey v. United States,137 Justice Harlan
urged that “[r]etroactivity must be rethought.”138 Justice Harlan depicted the
Court’s rulings on retroactivity in its criminal procedure decisions as a
haphazard mess, noting in Desist:
We have held that certain “new” rules are to be applied to all cases
then subject to direct review; certain others are to be applied to all
those cases in which trials have not yet commenced; certain others
are to be applied to all those cases in which the tainted evidence
has not yet been introduced at trial; and still others are to be
applied only to the party involved in the case in which the new
rule is announced and to all future cases in which the proscribed
official conduct has not yet occurred.139

Justice Harlan’s primary concern was with the arbitrariness of the
“chance beneficiaries”—that is, the litigants in whose cases the Court laid
down new rules and who, generally, got the benefit of those new rules—as
compared to other similarly situated litigants whose cases were in different
stages of litigation and would therefore not benefit from the new rules.140 At
a more fundamental level, though, he articulated a very different conception
of the judicial function and took issue with approaches that permitted the
Court “to act, in effect, like a legislature.”141 Because of these concerns,
136. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
137. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
138. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor noted in Teague v.
Lane that commentators had “‘had a veritable field day’ with the Linkletter standard,
with much of the discussion being ‘more than mildly negative.’” 489 U.S. 288, 303
(1989) (quoting Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a
Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1558 & n.3 (1975)).
139. Desist, 394 U.S. at 257 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). One could certainly
argue that the Court’s decisions, though seemingly random, were actually organized
around the principle that its rules should apply backward where the state actor knew or
could have known of the rule but failed to heed it. So, for example, if the rule was
announced before tainted evidence was introduced at trial, and the state actor proceeded to
introduce such evidence, there could be no reliance argument. Similarly, if the rule
related to lineups, it made sense to limit its retroactive effect to cases in which the
lineups had not taken place when the rule was announced. Viewed this way, the Court
appears far less unmoored—its decisions actually seem to make sense. Moreover, the
decisions even have a little bit of predictability, because a state actor could generally
know that it will not be punished for heeding an existing rule.
140. Id. at 258–59.
141. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 677 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Harlan was almost certainly influenced by Professor Mishkin’s influential
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Justice Harlan advocated full retroactivity for cases pending on direct
review, though in doing so, he indicated that habeas cases raised different
issues.142
In the decades that followed, Justice Harlan’s views gained traction,
ushering in changes in the criminal context as the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts took the stage. In 1987’s Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court formally
balked at selective prospectivity.143 At issue in Griffith was whether Batson v.
Kentucky144 ought to be given retroactive effect to other cases pending on
direct. Relying heavily on Harlan’s Desist and Mackey opinions, the Court
firmly shut down the notion that it had power to selectively apply certain
rules prospectively.145 The Griffith Court rejected Linkletter and held that all
new rules would henceforth apply to all cases pending on direct.146 The
Court limited its decision to the criminal context, specifically noting that
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson would have continued sway in the civil context.147
The Griffith Court grounded its decision in two main rationales.
First, it looked loosely to Article III, echoing the concerns about
prospective rulemaking articulated by Justice Harlan nearly two decades
before. The Court observed that it could only decide “cases and
controversies,” and if the court decided upon a new rule, “the integrity of
judicial review” required its application to other cases pending on direct.148
Quoting Harlan, the Court noted that, if it did not resolve all cases “in light
of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles,” it would
be acting inconsistently with the judicial function.149 Thus, to retain
integrity, judicial power was limited: A court must apply current law to

142.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

post-Linkletter article decrying prospectivity as an approach that might well undermine
the legitimacy of the Court as an institution. Mishkin, supra note 106, at 64–68; Fallon
& Meltzer, supra note 27, at 1743 (“For Justice Harlan, the rethinking began with an
article by Paul Mishkin, which had concluded that all new decisions should be fully
retroactive on direct review.”).
Desist, 394 U.S. at 258, 260 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan offered a means of
differentiating between clearly settled rules and new rules in the habeas context that
anticipated the line drawn by Justice O’Connor two decades later in Teague v. Lane.
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 305–09.
479 U.S. 314 (1987).
476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson invalidated race-based use of peremptory challenges in the
petit jury on Equal Protection Clause grounds. Id. at 89.
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322–23.
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 322 n.8.
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
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pending cases; any contrary power smacked of legislation.150 Second, the
Court agreed with Justice Harlan that it was arbitrary which case presenting
a particular issue it might take up on certiorari, and “selective application of
new rules violate[d] the principle of treating similarly situated defendants
the same.”151 Although the Court did not tie this concept explicitly to due
process or equal protection, its decision was clear, pronouncing decisively
that the time for tolerating such inequity “has come to an end.”152 With
these two rationales—Article III and arbitrariness—Griffith reversed
Linkletter.
On the heels of Griffith came Teague v. Lane in 1989. Teague qualified
the rule of retroactivity laid down in Griffith and made clear that it did not
apply in the habeas context.153 In Teague, the Court refused to make a new
rule regarding the Sixth Amendment “fair cross-section” requirement in a
habeas action, holding that, with two narrow exceptions, it would neither
make nor apply new rules on habeas.154 The Court allowed that it would
make or apply a new rule only where it placed “certain kinds of
primary . . . conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe” or set forth a “watershed rule[] of criminal procedure” without
which there was an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction.155
The Teague plurality premised its departure from the Griffith rule of full
retroactivity on comity and finality and the potential for massive disruption
in the habeas context.156
Together, Griffith and Teague laid out bright-line rules as to when
retroactivity was mandated in the criminal context: In short, it applies in all
cases pending on direct (and, necessarily, in all cases arising thereafter) and
in some small subset of cases on collateral review. In so doing, the Court’s
preoccupation with the proper judicial function pointed at an Article III

Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 323.
Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 555–56 n.16 (1982)).
489 U.S. 288, 305–10 (1989).
Id. at 292, 310–11. Justice O’Connor wrote for a plurality of four justices, but the
majority adopted her opinion four months later in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
313–14 (1989).
155. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). In Whorton v.
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417–18 (2007), the Court noted that since Teague, no new rule
has ever qualified as a “watershed rule of criminal procedure” within this second
exception.
156. Teague, 489 U.S. at 309–10.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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mooring, and concern for equity amongst litigants sounded a plausible equal
protection or due process refrain.
C.

The Civil Context Follows Suit

Selective prospectivity had a longer reign in the civil context. It was not
until the developing dormant commerce clause jurisprudence in the 1980s
and 1990s invalidated several discriminatory state tax schemes that the
Court reassessed selective prospectivity’s continued vitality.
Two important lines of cases marked the downfall of selective
prospectivity in civil cases: one finding dormant commerce clause violations
in state tax schemes that preferred in-state entities and one requiring
meaningful remedy for such violations.157 The conjunction of these two
lines of cases had serious implications for states that had wrongfully
collected discriminatory taxes. Immediately, states sought to evade
potentially catastrophic refund orders by invoking Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
as a limiting principle. In American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith,158 a case
involving a complicated tax scheme that preferred in-state truckers, the
Court split three different ways on whether Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
applied.159 During the pendency of Smith, the Supreme Court had ruled in
another case, American Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner,160 that such preferencebased taxes unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce.161

157. In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–73 (1984), the Supreme Court
invalidated a discriminatory Hawaii excise tax that preferred in-state liquor producers.
The Court did not address the question of remedy for the improper collection of taxes
under this scheme because the issue had not been presented to the state courts. Id. at
277. On the other hand, in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22 (1990), the remedy question was front and center. The
Florida Supreme Court had invalidated a state excise tax based on Bacchus but refused
to order refund of any monies collected pursuant to the discriminatory tax. The
Supreme Court held that, because Florida had provided no meaningful process by
which taxpayers could challenge the assessment before paying, it had to provide a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy curing the underlying discrimination, which the
state could do either by giving the money back to the out-of-state producers or by
collecting back taxes from the in-state producers to whom it had wrongfully granted an
exemption. Id. at 22–23.
158. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
159. Id. at 172.
160. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
161. Id. at 286–87. Scheiner itself had remanded the question of remedy to the state court in
the first instance. See id. at 297–98.

836

65 UCLA L. R EV. 808 (2018)

Smith presented the question whether Scheiner should apply
retroactively,162 and while five justices rejected retroactive application, the
Court supplied no clear or coherent rationale for why this was the case.
Justice O’Connor, writing for herself and three others, followed Chevron Oil
v. Huson, which Griffith had pointedly left intact,163 and concluded that the
potential disruption of the Scheiner rule for state treasuries warranted
prospective effect.164 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia likewise did
not believe Scheiner should have retroactive application, but he based his
decision on disagreement with Scheiner’s underlying premise, not on
Chevron Oil v. Huson.165 Indeed, rather than embracing Justice O’Connor’s
view of prospectivity, Justice Scalia agreed with the dissent that “prospective
decision-making is incompatible with the judicial role” and, thus,
inconsistent with Article III.166 Although Article III compelled retroactive
application, he determined that the inquiry in the next case, in this case
Smith, was a question of stare decisis. To Justice Scalia, stare decisis, in
contrast to retroactivity, was “a flexible command” that could yield where, as
here, Scheiner was (1) wrongly decided in the first instance and (2) states had
reasonably relied on the pre-Scheiner universe.167 Although Justice
O’Connor’s plurality and Justice Scalia’s dissent both permitted prospective
application, they did so on the basis of very contradictory rationales.

162. Smith, 496 U.S. at 176.
163. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 n.8 (1987).
164. Smith, 496 U.S. at 182–83, 187. Fallon and Meltzer observe that the plurality employed
a “starkly positivist outlook: sometimes courts make new law, and, when they do, they
must determine the new law’s effective date.” Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 27, at 1757.
This approach, they note, is incompatible with the judicial function as conceptualized
in Griffith. See id. Justice O’Connor did not think Griffith militated in favor of a
different result because she saw the criminal context as fundamentally distinct. Smith,
496 U.S. at 197. Griffith, she explained, was tied to the unfairness of subjecting two
similarly situated criminal defendants to different procedural rules. It was a situationspecific rejection of the idea that reliance interests of law enforcement should factor
into the calculus. Id. at 197–99.
165. Smith, 496 U.S. at 201–02 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
166. Id. Several commentators remarked at Justice Scalia’s neo-Blackstonian instincts in
this passage. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 27, at 1757; Stephens, supra note
126, at 1536. Justice Stevens, writing for himself and three colleagues, dissented. He
grounded his conclusion that the decision merited retroactive effect in “[f]undamental
notions of fairness and legal process.” Smith, 496 U.S. at 212–14 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens saw Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson as an outlier case that ought
to be confined to its statute of limitations context. See id. at 221–22.
167. Id. at 204–05 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O’Connor did not take
significant issue with Justice Scalia’s approach. In fact, her plurality characterized
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson as a “part of the doctrine of stare decisis.” Id. at 196 (plurality
opinion) (citing Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932)).
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The Supreme Court took a halting step toward easing the doctrinal
confusion the following year in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.168
The case concerned the retroactive application of Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, but James B. Beam also failed to command a majority opinion.169
Nominally, at least, the result was 6–3 for retroactive application of Bacchus
to compel refund of improperly collected excise taxes. However, the
majority broke into three camps anchored by Justices Souter, White, and
Blackmun/Scalia, each of whom conceptualized the problem very differently.
In the first camp, ostensibly announcing the judgment of “the Court,”
Justice Souter started with the premise that retroactive application is
“overwhelmingly the norm,” noting that it reflects the “declaratory theory of
law” and is “in keeping with the traditional function of the courts.”170 He
observed that Bacchus itself had remanded the case to the state court for
imposition of a remedy and thereby signified intent to give the litigants the
benefit of the rule it announced.171 Because the result in Bacchus had applied
to the Bacchus litigants, James B. Beam squarely presented the question
whether the Court would continue to approve of a rule of selective
prospectivity. To this, Justice Souter gave an emphatic “no,” deeming
selective prospectivity inconsistent with Griffith, which “cannot be confined
to the criminal law.”172 He took issue with the notion that similarly-situated
litigants could ever be treated differently, with different rules applicable to
their nonfinal cases.173 He determined that “[o]nce retroactive application
is chosen for any assertedly new rule,” it is “chosen for all others who might
seek its prospective application.”174 Although the opinion addressed itself
to selective prospectivity, Justice Souter’s opinion called pure prospectivity
into question as well: Even “[a]ssuming that pure prospectivity may be had
at all,” he reasoned, ”its scope must necessarily be limited to a small number
of cases.”175
Leading the second camp, Justice White agreed that the principles of
equity amongst similarly situated litigants articulated in Griffith compelled

501 U.S. 529 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 535 (Souter, J., opinion).
Id. at 539.
Id. at 540.
Id. Justice Souter noted that retroactivity would necessarily be limited by notions of
finality, and that expiration of a statute of limitations or principles of res judicata might
preclude application of new rules. Id. at 541.
174. Id. at 543.
175. Id. at 541.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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rejection of selective prospectivity.176 However, he took issue with Justice
Souter’s suggestion that “pure prospectivity” was in any jeopardy. He
reasoned that a rule of automatic retroactivity in all cases would require the
Court to overrule Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson and other decisions—decisions
with which he had agreed and from which he did not intend to depart.177
Justice White noted, in this connection, that pure prospectivity did not give
rise to similar inequity issues.178
In the last camp, Justices Blackmun and Scalia were willing to go much
further. Justice Blackmun sought a rule of full retroactivity in all nonfinal
cases and indicated that to do otherwise would “warp the role that we, as
judges, play in a Government of limited powers.”179 He tied his conclusion
not only to separation of powers but also to the integrity of the judicial
system, noting that “[r]espect for tribunals must fall when the bar and the
public come to understand that nothing that has been said in prior
adjudication has force in a current controversy.”180 Justice Scalia made the
constitutional point more explicitly: He argued that the function of judges
under Article III is to make law “as though they were ‘finding’ it—discerning
what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it
will tomorrow be.”181 To permit courts to lay down prospective rules, in his
view, would strip Article III courts of a fundamental, and crucial,
constitutional check on their office.182 At day’s end, the Court’s three camps
could not settle on a clear rationale for rejecting selective prospectivity in
James B. Beam.
The Court finally unified the various strands of its civil retroactivity
jurisprudence in 1993’s Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation.183
Harper involved a challenge to a state tax scheme that the Supreme Court
had invalidated in Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury,184 under
which the state had taxed federal retiree benefits but exempted state retiree
benefits. Petitioners, federal retirees, sought recovery of taxes wrongfully
collected pursuant to this unconstitutional scheme. The state supreme

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 545 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 545–46.
Id.
Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 548 (quoting Mahnich v. S. S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 113 (1944) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting)).
Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
509 U.S. 86 (1993).
489 U.S. 803 (1989).
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court, applying Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, determined that the Davis rule
ought to have prospective application only.185 In the Supreme Court’s
ruling, Justice Thomas held that James B. Beam controlled the case and
stated plainly for the Court that “[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal
law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of
federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on
direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate
or postdate our announcement of the rule.”186 Harper thus provided the
clear holding on selective prospectivity that had eluded the James B. Beam
plurality.
The Harper majority opinion adverted both to “basic norms of
constitutional adjudication” and to concern that legal rights might “shift and
spring,” resulting in differential treatment of similarly situated litigants.187
While the opinion itself focused in on selective prospectivity, Justice
O’Connor charged in dissent that the Court’s logic readily intimated that
“pure” prospectivity was in peril as well.188 The majority spent little time
185.
186.
187.
188.

Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 401 S.E.2d 868, 874 (Va. 1991).
Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 115 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Fisch, supra note 117, at 1062 (“Justice
Thomas’s five-Justice majority opinion in Harper went further and appeared to
invalidate pure, as well as selective, prospectivity.” (footnote omitted)). The Court said
in dicta in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), that, “[w]hile it was
accurate in 1974 to say that a new rule announced in a judicial decision was only
presumptively applicable to pending cases, we have since established a firm rule of
retroactivity.” Id. at 278 n.32 (citing Harper, 509 U.S. at 86). Lower courts have
divided on the question of the continued vitality of pure prospectivity after Harper.
Compare, e.g., Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 690–91 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(stating, post–Harper, that a court could choose between pure prospectivity and full
retroactivity so long as it did not employ selective prospectivity), and Crowe v. Bolduc,
365 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A court in a civil case may apply a decision purely
prospectively . . . .”), and Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (noting that the Court had retained the possibility of pure prospectivity),
with Kolkevich v. Att’y Gen., 501 F.3d 323, 337 n.9 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that the
status of pure prospectivity is uncertain after Harper), and Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp.,
178 F.3d 316, 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that pure prospectivity is “an indistinct
possibility” reserved for the “extremely unusual and unforeseeable case”), and In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 925 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that
“language in the Court’s recent opinions convinces us that purely prospective
adjudication is at least unwise and most likely beyond our power” as an advisory
opinion), and Fairfax Covenant Church v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 17 F.3d 703, 710 (4th
Cir. 1994) (“Though the precise issue in Harper was so-called ‘selective prospectivity,’
every indication in the opinion of the Court is that its logic would also forbid all types
of prospectivity.”). The Supreme Court has never expressly settled the question. See
RICHARD H. FALLON JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 55 (7th ed. 2015).
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developing the constitutional underpinnings of its result; a more elaborate
justification for the rule emerged in Justice Scalia’s separate concurring
opinion, in which he stated—again—that “prospective decision-making is
quite incompatible with the judicial power, and . . . courts have no authority
to engage in the practice.”189 As Justice Scalia conceived it, fully retroactive
decisionmaking was the singular distinction between judicial and
legislative power, carefully grounded in the separation of powers.190
D.

Efforts to Craft Exceptions

By 1993, then, firm scaffolding for adjudicative retroactivity was in
place both in the civil and criminal contexts. In 1995, the Court confronted,
and rejected, an attempted workaround in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v.
Hyde,191 a case involving a statute of limitations tolling provision that
applied to benefit in-state actors over out-of-state actors. In Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.,192 the Court had invalidated such tolling
provisions and applied its rule to the litigants before it.193 Reynoldsville
Casket asked whether states had discretion to bring Chevron Oil balancing in
at the remedy stage. In other words, under Harper, if the state court was
bound to apply a rule retroactively, could it nonetheless use principles of
equity, fairness, and reliance to blunt or even counter its effect?194
Straightforward application of Harper required application of the Bendix
rule to dismiss the suit in Reynoldsville Casket. Yet the Ohio Supreme Court
opted to permit the time-barred suit anyway.195

189. Harper, 509 U.S. at 106 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 107. Justice Scalia observed that even supporters of prospective judicial
decisionmaking admitted it to be a “technique of judicial lawmaking.” Id. at 108
(quoting Beryl Harold Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1960)).
191. 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
192. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
193. Id. at 891.
194. Id. at 753–54. To a degree, the approach urged by Hyde, the respondent, resembles the
sleight of hand that Justice Scalia employed in his concurrence in the judgment in
Smith: Courts must require retroactivity but employ some different rubric to effectively
deny the effect of prior precedent. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,
204–05 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (invoking flexibility inherent in stare
decisis to avoid retroactive application of a precedent).
195. Reynoldsville, 514 U.S. at 751. The Ohio court did not expressly state that it was
invoking remedial discretion in doing so; this, however, was how the respondent
justified the court’s decision before the Supreme Court. See id. at 752–53.
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In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Court rejected the invocation of
“remedy” to avoid retroactive application of the Bendix rule. The Court
admitted that the concept of remedial discretion had surfaced in its tax
refund opinions but observed that, in those cases, discretion lay in the state’s
two possible solutions to a discriminatory tax: Either the state could refund
the tax (tax neither) or it could assess in-state actors and thus eliminate the
underlying discrimination (tax both).196 Selecting between these two options
fell soundly within the state’s remedial discretion because both resolved the
underlying unconstitutionality. In the case before it, in contrast, the Court
found that the state’s chosen remedy, allowing respondent’s suit to proceed
against an out-of-state defendant even though it would have been timebarred against an in-state defendant, did not rectify the underlying
unconstitutionality.197 The state was permitted remedial discretion to
choose among alternatives in curing the constitutional violation; it could
not, in the name of “remedial discretion,” opt not to provide any cure at
all.198
In reaching this conclusion, the Reynoldsville Casket Court was
unmoved by other contexts where it had effectively refused to apply “new”
decisions for other reasons. Hyde had pointed to the doctrine of qualified
immunity, under which the Court precludes recovery of civil damages where
a state officer has relied on clearly established precedent, and Teague, under
which the Court generally refuses to apply new rules to cases arising in
habeas,199 to urge that the Harper retroactivity rule was frequently
overridden.200 The Court rejected this gambit, answering that each of these
situations raised very different policy considerations. Qualified immunity
reflects concern that state officers not be chilled in the performance of their
duties and represents an independent legal ground for barring a claim,
unrelated to retroactivity.201 Teague is not an exception to retroactivity, but
rather, it reflects a limitation on the principle itself to cases that are nonfinal:
“New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases
already closed.”202 The Court found that neither situation represented a
qualification of the underlying principle set out in Griffith and Harper that
Id. at 755.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 753–54.
See id. at 757–58 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); id. at 758–59
(citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
200. Id. at 757–59.
201. See id. at 757–58 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
202. Id. at 758.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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new rules would apply retroactively to all nonfinal criminal and civil cases.203
The Court altogether rejected any effort to craft a general “remedial”
exception to the firm rule of retroactivity, concluding that doing so would
reduce Harper to little more than “symbolic significance.”204
The Court again addressed possible exception to the firm
Griffith/Harper adjudicative retroactivity doctrine in Davis v. United
States.205 In Davis, police acting pursuant to appellate precedent construing
New York v. Belton206 had searched the passenger compartment of
defendant’s car incident to his arrest and thereby found a revolver. After his
conviction on the firearm charge, and while his appeal was pending, the
Supreme Court handed down Arizona v. Gant,207 which substantially and
materially changed the law related to vehicle searches such that the search of
the defendant’s car was no longer legal under the Fourth Amendment. Davis
presented the question whether, consistent with the required retroactive
application of Gant, defendant could have the firearm evidence excluded under
the exclusionary rule.208 Building upon the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule recognized in United States v. Leon,209 the Supreme Court
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that the officers’ good-faith reliance on
existing precedent precluded application of the exclusionary rule, even when
the Supreme Court had subsequently overruled that precedent while the case
was pending on direct appeal.210

203. Id. at 759.
204. Id. at 754; see also Brooke A. Weedon, Note, New Limits on General Personal
Jurisdiction: Examining the Retroactive Application of Daimler in Long-Pending Cases,
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1549, 1573 (2015) (noting Reynoldsville Casket’s rejection of a
proposed remedial exception as means of circumventing Harper).
205. 564 U.S. 229 (2011). In 2008, the Court touched upon retroactivity in Danforth v.
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008). Danforth raised the question whether states could give
effect to “new” rules in state habeas even where Teague might bar their use in federal
habeas. The Court held that Teague’s rule of nonretroactivity did not bind state courts.
Id. at 290–91. In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts derided the majority on the grounds
that it permitted different results for similarly situated litigants. Id. at 301–03 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
206. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
207. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
208. Davis, 564 U.S. at 236.
209. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon recognized a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule,
predicating it on an understanding that the exclusionary rule is a device employed to
deter unlawful police conduct. Id. at 922–25. The Leon Court recognized that the
exclusionary rule is not a necessary corollary to the Fourth Amendment but a practical
device to be employed when its benefits (deterrence) outweigh its costs (exclusion of
incriminating evidence). Id. at 906–08.
210. Davis, 564 U.S. at 241.
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In reaching its decision, the Court had to wrestle with the question of
what, exactly, retroactivity really meant. Justice Alito, writing for the Court,
said that “[o]ur retroactivity jurisprudence is concerned with whether, as a
categorical matter, a new rule is available on direct review as a potential
ground for relief.”211 Thus, Griffith lifted a “categorical bar” to obtaining
relief and gave rise to a subsequent court’s duty to grapple with the new rule;
it did not, however, guarantee that relief would be available despite other,
independent bars.212 Retroactive application of Gant thus meant Gant would
apply unless other independent doctrines operated to bar its effect. Given
Gant, a defendant could pass through the gate and raise a Gant claim.
However, an independent doctrine—like a good-faith exception premised
on reliance on existing legal precedent—might preclude further advance.213
Application of the good-faith exception, the Court concluded, “neither
contravenes Griffith nor denies retroactive effect to Gant.”214 The Court
acknowledged, in so doing, that reasonable reliance on existing precedent
was a concept that had been embedded in the old Linkletter/Chevron Oil
balancing tests that retroactivity jurisprudence had rejected; however, “[t]hat
reasonable reliance by police was once a factor in our retroactivity cases does
not make it any less relevant under our Leon line of cases.”215

211. Id. at 243.
212. Id.
213. Davis reflects the Supreme Court’s omnipresent concern with minimizing the
disruptive effects of legal change. If retroactivity doctrine is not availing, the same
concepts surface as a horse of another color. See generally Toby J. Heytens, The
Framework(s) of Legal Change, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 609 (2012) (arguing that “it is
inevitable that the Supreme Court will be acutely concerned about the disruptive effects
of law-changing decisions on previously decided cases and that it will actively search
for ways to limit those effects”).
214. Davis, 564 U.S. at 244.
215. Id. at 245. In a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer charged the majority
with resurrecting the very problems that Griffith had sought to address in overruling
Linkletter. See id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The defendant in Gant had received
the benefit of the Gant rule, while other litigants whose seemingly identical cases were
proceeding on appeal could not, a prospect that raised every horrible outcome
envisioned decades prior by Justice Harlan. Surprisingly, Justice Breyer did not reckon
with his own opinion in Reynoldsville Casket, in which he had carefully distinguished
retroactivity on the one hand from independent doctrines that might operate to
preclude a particular remedy on the other. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514
U.S. 749, 758–59 (1995). It was certainly possible to see Davis as mired in its
exclusionary rule context, a decision emanating fairly from its United States v. Leon
antecedents. But Justice Breyer rejected any effort to recognize an additional
independent doctrine—much like qualified immunity—that might practically impede a
particular form of relief and instead saw the case as an affront to the doctrine of
retroactivity itself.
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Constitutional Moorings of Retroactivity and the Duty to Grapple

After a couple of messy decades, the Supreme Court has ultimately
concluded that, generally speaking, a new rule applies to any nonfinal
criminal or civil case, regardless of what rule obtained at the time of the
events giving rise to the legal action.216 The Court has left the status of pure
prospectivity vague in the civil context. However, the unqualified logic of
Harper suggests that pure prospectivity, like selective prospectivity, is in
peril, as the Harper dissent charged217 and subsequent Supreme Court cases
have appeared to assume.218 Moreover, retroactivity is firmly in place
despite the Court’s recognition of a couple of independent doctrines—like
stare decisis, official immunity, and the Davis rule—that may operate to preclude
a specific form of relief. The Davis Court carefully decoupled two questions:
whether the rule applies retroactively to nonfinal cases (yes), and whether a
litigant is entitled to the particular relief requested (not necessarily, given the
operation of an independent doctrine). Along the way, the Court has hinted that
adjudicative retroactivity is justified by constitutional imperative. The Court has
never clearly identified the constitutional cubby-hole into which it places
retroactivity, but several lurking constitutional doctrines may underlie its
compulsion and are worth examining separately.219
First, beginning with Justice Harlan’s opinions in Desist and Mackey
and continuing in the majority opinion in Griffith, a strong undercurrent in
the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence has been its rejection of the
arbitrariness and inequity of giving one litigant the benefit of a new rule
216. See Roosevelt, supra note 109, at 1103 (“The end of all the Court’s explorings has been
to arrive, more or less, where it started . . . .”).
217. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 115 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
218. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278 n.32 (1994) (observing that the
Court has “established a firm rule of retroactivity”). Lower courts are in some disarray
on this point, see supra note 187, given the absence of a definitive Supreme Court
holding, with some courts seeing significance in the Harper Court’s confinement of
its holding to selective prospectivity and that others extrapolating from the Harper
Court’s Article III rationale. The Ninth Circuit noted in Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646
F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), that “even if ‘recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
has perhaps called into question the continuing viability of [its precedent], we are
bound to follow a controlling Supreme Court precedent until it is explicitly overruled
by that Court.’” Id. at 692 (quoting United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1079 n.16
(9th Cir. 2005)). On that basis, the court felt constrained to apply Chevron Oil. Id.
219. See Fisch, supra note 117, at 1062 (“[T]he Court [has not] explained whether its
apparent rejection of pure prospectivity is based on prudential considerations or is
constitutionally compelled.”); id. at 1073 (“[T]he Court has not fully confronted the
issue of whether and to what extent the Constitution limits judicial or legislative ability
to define the temporal effect of a new legal rule.”).
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while denying it to others who are similarly situated. Justice Harlan decried
as fundamentally unfair the notion that a court might “[s]imply fish[] one
case from the stream of appellate review, us[e] it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permit[] a stream of
similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule . . . .”220 The
Griffith Court said selectively applying new rules “violates the principle of
treating similarly situated defendants the same;”221 the Court then quoted a
Justice Marshall dissent in which he lamented that “[d]ifferent treatment of
two cases is justified under our Constitution only when the cases differ in
some respect relevant to the different treatment.”222 Echoing Griffith, the
Harper Court was “[m]indful of the ‘basic norms of constitutional
adjudication’” when it banned the “selective application of new rules.”223 More
recently, Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting in Danforth v. Minnesota,224 observed
that “Justice Story, writing for the Court, noted nearly two centuries ago that
the Constitution requires ‘uniformity of decisions throughout the whole
United States, upon all subjects within [its] purview.’”225 Certainly, all of this
sounds in due process and equal protection.226 Yet the Court has not gone
so far as to say so explicitly. The Griffith majority’s quotation of Justice
Marshall, suggesting that different treatment of like cases offends the
Constitution, is about as close as the Court has come.
Despite the superficial appeal of a due process or equal protection
mooring, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will get any closer to it.
Although the Court has frequently suggested a constitutional dimension to

220. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
221. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987).
222. Id. at 327 (quoting Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 60 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
223. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (quoting Griffith, 479 U.S. at
322–23).
224. 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
225. Id. at 301 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816)). Chief Justice Roberts also cited Justice O’Connor for the
“fundamental principle” of our Constitution “that a single sovereign’s laws should be
applied equally to all.” Id. at 301–02 (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Judicial
Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984–1985)).
226. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State
shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). The Court has likewise linked due process to equal
treatment for some time. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603 (1900) (“[D]ue
process of law, within the meaning of the Constitution, is secured when the laws
operate on all alike . . . .”).
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the requirement of equal treatment amongst litigants, tethering retroactivity
expressly to the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses would have
incidental undesirable consequences: If the Court were to expressly link the
application of different rules to similarly situated litigants directly to the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, it would follow that state
courts would have to give retroactive effect to their decisions, too—even
those concerning purely state law questions. The prospect of this intrusion
on state prerogatives, and the corresponding surge in the federal docket,
may well lead the Court to stop short of connecting the dots in any specific
way, preferring instead to leave concerns of unfairness and inequity vague at
the margins.227 At the end of the day, the problems of inequity may be less
that unequal treatment offends a principle requiring equal treatment and
more that such inequity does more intangible harm, such as to the
institutional legitimacy of Article III courts.228
A more compelling constitutional mooring for the concept of
retroactivity is found in Article III and emerges primarily in separate
opinions in James B. Beam and Harper.229 The Article III justification has a
case or controversy component and a more generalized separation of powers
component. First and foremost, the case and controversies component

227. The Supreme Court has already fielded, and rejected, a petition for certiorari raising
the claim that West Virginia’s invocation of selective prospectivity regarding a state
court decision violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. See Findley
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 539 U.S. 942 (2003) (mem.). In Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932), the Supreme Court
said that “the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject” of state
retroactivity, and that states may choose prospective application. Mooring
adjudicative retroactivity in due process or equal protection would certainly
necessitate revisiting this opinion. If due process or equal protection are offended
by the application of different rules to similarly situated litigants, they would
presumably be offended whether those rules are state or federal in their origin.
228. It bears mention, moreover, that the inequity rationale supports abandonment of
selective prospectivity only; it does nothing to imperil the operation of pure
prospectivity. This accounts for Justice White’s opinion in James B. Beam Distilling Co.
v. Georgia, in which he decried the unfairness of selective prospectivity while
simultaneously endorsing pure prospectivity. 501 U.S. 529, 545–46 (1991) (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).To date, no other justice has joined Justice White in
viewing inequity as the sole justification for retroactivity.
229. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 106 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[P]rospective decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power . . . .”);
James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that
anything other than full retroactivity would “warp the role that we, as judges, play in a
Government of limited powers”); id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(suggesting that retroactivity is critical to maintaining the proper judicial role in our
federal system).
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sounds in the nature of the judicial function. What federal judges do, per
Article III, is decide cases and controversies, disputes that are “appropriately
resolved through the judicial process.”230 They apply rules where necessary
in the context of concrete disputes, and they expound and interpret the law
only as an incidental byproduct of the task of adjudicating such
controversies.231 Under this theory, a decision that applies merely
prospectively represents an impermissible advisory opinion (a case or
controversy problem) and threatens to usurp the province of the legislature (a
related separation of powers problem).232 In discussing the second component,
separation of powers, the Court has suggested that refusing to apply extant
rules in adjudicating a case or controversy itself trenches on the legislative
function; thus, to ensure a separation between the judiciary and the
legislature, Article III requires some tethering to prior rules and permits
the creation of new rules only out of necessity.233
The Court has consistently sounded this separation of powers refrain
over various contexts. A majority of five in Harper assented that “‘the
nature of judicial review’ strips us of the quintessentially ‘legislat[ive]’
prerogative to make rules of law retroactive or prospective as we see fit.”234
Elsewhere, the Court has remarked that the Framers “lived among the ruins
of a system of intermingled legislative and judicial powers,” as a result of
which they felt “sharp necessity” to keep legislative and judicial powers
separate.235 The Roberts Court has repeatedly suggested that rulemaking is
only a byproduct of adjudication between real litigants. In Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins,236 the Court, per Justice Alito, deemed it necessary, under Article III,
to “confine[] the federal courts to a properly judicial role” to “‘prevent the

230. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
231. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating that courts “of
necessity expound and interpret” rules in connection with “particular cases”); see also
Fisch, supra note 117, at 1076 (“[S]eparation of powers considerations can be used to
argue that adjudication should be exclusively retroactive.”).
232. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 27, at 1798–99; see also James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 547
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Unlike a legislature, we do not
promulgate new rules ‘to be applied prospectively only’ . . . .”); id. at 549 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting that although judges most certainly make law,
they are constrained to do so “as judges make it”).
233. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (mooring adjudicative retroactivity in
“the integrity of judicial review” under Article III).
234. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993) (quoting Griffith, 479 U.S. at
322).
235. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219, 221 (1995).
236. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
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judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches.”237 The Court made clear in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno238 that
the case or controversy requirement “ensur[es] that the Federal Judiciary
respects ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a
democratic society.”239 In Chafin v. Chafin,240 a unanimous Court stated
firmly that federal courts may not “decide questions that cannot affect the
rights of litigants in the case before them,”241 which comes about as close as
one can imagine to a statement that pure prospectivity is incompatible with
Article III, equivocation in Harper notwithstanding.242
At day’s end, retroactivity probably has a core constitutional
component, but despite much harrumphing over inequity amongst similarly
situated litigants, its ready cubby-hole is most likely to be Article III.243
Tethering the rule to Equal Protection or Due Process imposes too many
implications for state laws and state retroactivity principles. The Court’s
adjudicative retroactivity jurisprudence, with its emphasis on the proper
exercise of the judicial function, seemingly finds a comfortable place
amongst standing, advisory opinion, and other separation of powers cases.

III.

CONFLICT BETWEEN RETROACTIVITY AND THE
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

Reducing retroactivity to its simplest terms, a rule laid down in a case on
day one, whether criminal or civil, must also apply to any nonfinal case pending

Id. at 1547 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013)).
547 U.S. 332 (2006).
Id. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
568 U.S. 165 (2013).
Id. at 172 (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)).
In related contexts, the Roberts Court has leaned heavily on formalist conceptions of
separation of powers, with Chief Justice Roberts opining for the Court in Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), that the Framers considered it absolutely essential to separate
“the power of judging” from the legislative and executive powers. Id. at 483 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). The
Court repeated this as recently as 2015 in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,
135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), noting that Article III “established a judiciary ‘truly distinct
from both the legislature and the executive.’” Id. at 1951 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
243. Professor Henry Paul Monaghan tied the doctrine of stare decisis to Article III as well,
noting its role in maintaining the legitimacy of judicial review. See Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 754
(1988). Professor Michael C. Dorf similarly found a home for “the precept that like
cases should be treated alike” in Article III’s conception of the judicial power. Michael
C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 1997 (1994).
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
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on day one and to any case that arises on any day after that. Its application
can be somewhat metaphysical, as Davis makes clear: The rule can “apply”
but find its impact blunted, or even negated, by the operation of
independent doctrines. Moreover, even the staunchest adherents of stare
decisis admit that a rule may be circumscribed—even overruled—if it
becomes fundamentally unworkable or loses its logical underpinnings.244 At
a minimum, though, settled retroactivity jurisprudence imposes a duty to
grapple with the new rule in any currently pending cases and in all cases yet
to arise. But in the absence of an independent doctrine or fundamental
unworkability,245 the Court has not permitted departure from its baseline
retroactivity jurisprudence post–Harper, and it has strongly hinted that this
law has its root in the judicial power and Article III.246
At this point, we journey back to the nonprecedential opinion. Does
the proliferation of nonprecedential opinions in our system have anything to
do with the Supreme Court’s adjudicative retroactivity jurisprudence? The
answer depends on whether a nonprecedential opinion breaks new ground
or whether it merely applies settled rules, and the substantial body of
nonprecedential opinions today certainly includes examples of each.247 This
Part starts by identifying fundamental conflict between the nonprecedential
opinion and adjudicative retroactivity where opinions break new ground.
Then, because differentiating between opinions that “break new ground”
and opinions that “merely apply settled rules” is itself a struggle, this Part
proceeds to recommend importation of familiar “new rule” constructs
developed in other contexts.
A.

Retroactivity Requires Precedential Effect for New Rules

Neither Judge Arnold nor Judge Kozinski adverted to the Court’s
adjudicative retroactivity jurisprudence in grappling with Article III
courts’ ability to control the precedential effect of their decisions. Hart
244. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (noting
that stare decisis is not an “inexorable command” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
245. Of course, even a departure from stare decisis requires courts to grapple with
precedent, so it necessarily assumes application of the “old” rule in the first instance.
See Price, supra note 90, at 109.
246. Recall Justice Breyer’s conclusion in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, that, unless there
is a “special reason” grounded in independently justified norms not to apply Harper v.
Virginia Department of Taxation, retroactivity principles control. Reynoldsviille Casket
Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1995); see Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 US 86 (1993).
247. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
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contains no citation to Griffith, Harper, or James B. Beam. Anastasoff cites
James B. Beam for the proposition that a declaration of law “must be applied
in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties” but does not invoke
adjudicative retroactivity as a rationale for questioning nonprecedential
opinions.248 Both Anastasoff and Hart addressed the precedential effect of
unpublished decisions with presumed impact in the case; the litigants sought
to rely on them (or distinguish them) because they had an apparent impact
on the dispute at bar.249
At first blush, their failure to consider adjudicative retroactivity may
be understandable; it is tempting to see adjudicative retroactivity and the
nonprecedential opinion as distinct. Whether it is permissible to restrict
the precedential effect of a decision, after all, is a question about the opinion’s
future. It asks whether a court can, consistent with the Constitution, dictate
that an opinion is to have no future effect. The Supreme Court’s retroactivity
cases have assumed without question that rules will apply to future events;
instead, adjudicative retroactivity cases have looked backward, asking
whether and to what extent rules may apply to cases that are already in the
pipeline, arising from facts and circumstances that have already occurred.
But superficial dissimilarity between adjudicative retroactivity and
issues presented by nonprecedential opinions fades upon further inspection.
A court limiting the precedential effect of an opinion is saying, in essence,
that it will apply solely to the litigants before it. It will not apply to cases that
emerge in the future and it also will not apply to other cases pending today. If
refusing to apply a rule to pending cases offends,250 the nonprecedential
opinion is plainly offensive. This exclusive, one-time applicability is even
more restrictive than selective prospectivity, which applies to litigants before
the court and to future litigants, as well. But plainly settled rules laid down
in Griffith and Harper require that a novel decision released on day one and
applied to the litigants on day one must also apply to other litigants whose
248. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991)).
249. Patricia Hart’s lawyer had attempted to cite Rice v. Chater, to flag that a particular legal
question was open in the Ninth Circuit; Rice had expressly declined to reach the issue.
Rice v. Chater, 98 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1996); see Opening Brief of Appellant at 13 n.6,
Hart v. Apfel, No. 99-56472 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 1999).
250. Harper certainly made this much clear. Harper, 509 U.S. at 86; see supra notes 183–190
and accompanying text. Harper goes beyond this, of course, in stating that a rule must
be retroactive “as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate
our announcement of the rule.” Id. at 97 (emphasis added). This is a seemingly ringing
endorsement of the notion that the Supreme Court simply assumes application to
litigants in the future.

Nonprecedential Opinions

851

cases are pending on day one.251 On its face, then, the nonprecedential
opinion that breaks new ground trenches on settled adjudicative
retroactivity jurisprudence. It then goes further and works even more
offense on the principles underlying adjudicative retroactivity, by
circumscribing the opinion’s utility in cases in which everyone has,
heretofore at least, agreed that an opinion would apply: the case arising on
day two.
Obviously, as Reynoldsville Casket and Davis recognized, theoretical
application of an opinion to pending or future cases does not guarantee
victory for a litigant who stands to benefit from that rule: It merely imposes
on a court a duty to grapple with the new rule.252 Recovery may elude a
plaintiff due to presence of an independent doctrine, like official immunity
or good-faith reliance on prior cases (even if they have subsequently been
overruled).253 So, too, an opinion can technically apply but a court may
choose to overrule it, finding its faulty premises or unworkability sufficient
to justify departure from principles of stare decisis, as Justice Scalia was
willing to do in American Trucking.254 These doctrines represent separate,
discrete reasons that a litigant may not get much, if any, benefit from a rule.
None of them tell a court that an opinion is inapplicable ab initio or
discharge a court of its duty to grapple.255
The nonprecedential opinion, however, does just this, precluding
application of a decision to pending and future cases without invocation of
any independent, separately motivated doctrine save purported
convenience. The proliferation of nonprecedential opinions that break new
251. As I have argued, supra notes 217–218, it also applies to preclude “pure” prospectivity,
but nonprecedential opinions, which necessarily apply to the litigants presenting the
issues, do not raise pure prospectivity questions.
252. See supra notes 199–215 and accompanying text.
253. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 239–40 (2011); see generally Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (conferring immunity on government officials
performing discretionary functions so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known”).
254. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 204–05 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). In Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184–85 (1995), the Court rejected
an attempt to carve out an additional exception for cases where targets of an
enforcement action brought Appointments Clause challenges, noting that retroactive
application to the seven to ten pending cases would create neither grave disruption nor
major inequity.
255. See Price, supra note 90, at 109 (explaining that “the judicial power” requires that the
decisionmaking process “at least begins from prior precedent, whether the court then
considers itself ‘bound’ by precedent, able to ‘overrule’ precedent,” or able to
distinguish it).
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ground thus represents a previously unrecognized exception to adjudicative
retroactivity jurisprudence. Because in a majority of circuits, courts operate
without substantive check in determining whether an opinion has
precedential effect,256 this “exception,” like the remedial flexibility urged in
Reynoldsville Casket,257 threatens grave damage to the underlying rule. If an
opinion must, under settled doctrine, have applicability in pending and
future cases, but only if the panel feels like it or believes the subject
important enough, then the doctrine of adjudicative retroactivity is very
porous, if not altogether bereft of substance. The pragmatic considerations
urged by Judge Kozinski cannot in themselves justify a recognized
“exception” to adjudicative retroactivity. Harper and Griffith firmly put to
rest the idea courts can refuse enforcement of a “new rule” simply because it
is inconvenient, potentially disruptive, or even catastrophic,258 and
Reynoldsville Casket specifically refused an exception premised on fairness
and pragmatism that threatened to eviscerate this baseline rule.259
B.

Invoking the “New Rule” Paradigm

Examining the phenomenon of nonprecedential opinions through a
retroactivity lens, it seems doctrinally clear enough that any decision that
breaks new ground must have precedential effect as to both pending and
future cases.260 However, the same need not be said for opinions that merely
apply settled law. If an opinion simply works within the confines of existing
rules, there is no “new rule” and therefore no need to ponder its precedential
effect: The underlying rules are already available to litigants.261 Put simply,

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 754 (1995).
See supra notes 143–152, 183–190 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text.
See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“[T]hat [new] rule . . . must
be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events,
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.”).
For an analysis reaching similar conclusions that does not contemplate retroactivity
doctrine, see Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Precedent, Judicial Power, and the
Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1037, 1052 (2002) (“Cases in which a court can rely upon an existing precedent
without making an analogical leap are not therefore properly identified as
precedents themselves, since they do not engage in legal reasoning but rather
assume as correct the reasoning of the cases upon which they rely.”).
261. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982) (“[W]hen a decision of this
Court merely has applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations, no
real question has arisen as to whether the later decision should apply retrospectively.”).
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
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there is no necessary requirement that the Jones case should have
applicability beyond the Jones facts when all it does is perform a
straightforward application of the Smith rule. The next set of litigants
already has Smith at its disposal; Jones by definition has broken no new
ground and thus is not needed in any subsequent lawyer’s arsenal.
Conversely, if the Jones case alters Smith in some substantive way or applies
it in a novel or unanticipated situation, then settled adjudicative retroactivity
principles ought to require that Jones be available to litigants whose cases are
pending or will arise in the future.
Although a handful of courts of appeal have attempted to track this
distinction,262 the “new rule” construct,263 developed in the context of both
habeas corpus264 and official immunities,265 may provide a better-developed,
readily applicable paradigm for differentiating permissible and
impermissible restrictions on precedential effect.266
Teague itself
267
acknowledged difficulty in defining new rules precisely. However, at this

262. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
263. Professors Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 27, at 1735–36, first remarked upon and
systematically analyzed use of the “new law” construct in several different and
seemingly unrelated areas of the law.
264. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception to
the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to
those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”).
265. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982) (shielding officers from liability
unless their conduct violates “clearly established” rules of which they should have been
aware).
266. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 27, at 2118 n.32 (noting that, because “whole areas of
law” have been built upon the distinction between new and old rules, it has utility in
other contexts). To be sure, the standard in Teague, 489 U.S. at 288, has its critics, and
differentiating “new” from “old” rules has often divided the Court. In Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 408–10, 414 (1990), a habeas petitioner challenged officers’
interrogation of him regarding another crime after he had invoked his right to counsel. A
prior case, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981), had established that
interrogation was to stop once a suspect asked for a lawyer. In Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d
255, 257–59 (4th Cir. 1988), the Fourth Circuit rejected Butler’s claim that Edwards
ought to encompass interrogation for other potential crimes. While Butler’s appeal was
pending, the Supreme Court issued Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1988),
which stated that initiating interrogation regarding other crimes violated Edwards.
Although Roberson itself seemed to feel the compulsion of Edwards, the Court in
Butler, 494 U.S. at 415, determined that Roberson had set forth a “new rule.” See
generally Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 423, 440–42 (1994) (arguing that the Butler Court strips the “new rule” inquiry of
content because no two cases will be identical).
267. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (“It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case
announces a new rule . . . .”).
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point, after decades of elaboration, it is possible to sift through the Teague
precedents to glean some core principles.
In the habeas context, a rule is generally “new” if it “breaks new
ground” and is not “dictated” by prior precedent.268 The Court has applied
the “dictated by” standard parsimoniously. A rule may be “new” even where
it is a logical outgrowth of an existing opinion or is strongly suggested by an
existing opinion.269 A rule may be “new” even where the Court itself says
that prior case law requires the Court to announce it.270 Where a rule is
subject to debate amongst reasonable jurists, it is not compelled by prior
cases, and disagreement evinced by judges writing separate opinions is
strong evidence of novelty.271 The concept of newness will obviously depend
on the level of generality employed; the more specifically the “old” rule is
conceived, the more likely it is that any subsequent application of it will be
perceived as novel.272
Conversely, a case does not announce a new rule if it merely applies a
governing principle from a prior case to a nonidentical set of facts. A rule is
developed in contemplation of a set of factual circumstances in which it is likely
to apply. When a case whose facts fall within the anticipated compass of a rule
arises, “when all we do is apply a general standard to the kind of factual
circumstances it was meant to address, we will rarely state a new rule . . . .”273 Put
more concretely, when the Court applies the Strickland v. Washington274
standard governing ineffective assistance of counsel to a lawyer’s behavior at

268. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S.
at 301).
269. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234–35 (1990) (holding that a rule is new where
it represents a “gradual development in the law over which reasonable jurists may
disagree . . . .”).
270. See Butler, 494 U.S. at 415.
271. See O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 159–60 (1997) (observing that an “array of
views” expressed in a prior opinion precluded the conclusion that it laid out a clear
“old” rule); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 535–36 (1997) (noting that the
existence of several concurring and dissenting opinions to support the conclusion that
the rule was not “dictated” by precedent); Butler, 494 U.S. at 415 (citing differing
opinions amongst court of appeals judges to support the conclusion that the rule was
new); Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 236–37 (noting the dissent of three justices in a prior case to
support the conclusion that the rule was new).
272. See Meyer, supra note 266, at 457.
273. Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347–48 (2013); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S.
277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“Where the beginning point is
a rule of this general application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a
myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that
it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.”).
274. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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trial, it does not state a new rule.275 A lawyer may fail to present key
witnesses, skip vital objections, or sleep through trial; in each case,
application of the familiar Strickland standard stakes out no new ground.
When, however, a court confronts the question whether defendants are
entitled to effective assistance of counsel during the parole process, and thus
whether Strickland is susceptible of a categorically new application, it would
create a new rule.276 This distinction requires both grasp of the intended
scope of a rule and familiarity with its garden-variety applications.
The law has evolved in a similar fashion in the official immunity context,
albeit using slightly different terminology. An official is immune from damages
liability unless her conduct violates “clearly established law,” whose
existence is “beyond debate.”277 The Court has repeatedly instructed lower
courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”278
Thus, an official is not liable merely because she is expected to understand
that the Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures;
instead, she must know, and have no cause to doubt, that the specific actions
she plans to undertake represent a violation.279 Where there are no prior
published decisions on point, or where whatever opinions exist have only
cursory analysis, a right is not “clearly established.”280 Where judges
themselves have split on the question, as evinced either in circuit splits or in
dissenting opinions, a rule is not “clearly established.”281 As in the Teague
context, application of the new rule construct in the immunity context
seemingly requires a rule with reasonably specific definition and knowledge
of its garden-variety applications. A court need not have previously
encountered the precise facts to conclude that an officer’s actions violate the
expected scope of the rule.
Synthesizing these two contexts provides a helpful framework for
determining how and when an opinion ought to have precedential effect
under adjudicative retroactivity doctrine. An opinion creates “new” law,
275. See Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 348–49.
276. See id. at 352–53. This distinction also explains Butler, 494 U.S. at 414–15, which
differentiated between routine applications of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),
and applications of Edwards to a new situation.
277. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
278. Id. at 742; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (“[T]he right allegedly
violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity . . . .”).
279. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866–67 (2017) (indicating that the relevant
question is whether particular conduct is plainly in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
280. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616.
281. See id. at 618.
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and thus must serve as precedent, if it is not dictated by prior, wellreasoned, and specific precedent.282 Disagreement among members of the
panel is enough to call into question whether an opinion is “dictated” by prior
law or whether its holding is debatable amongst reasonable jurists.283 Where
the panel does not agree, the opinion is “new” and thus should have
precedential effect.284 So, too, if an opinion takes familiar principles but
imports them into a new context beyond the expected compass of the rule, it
should have precedential effect.285
On the other hand, not all opinions need be precedential. An opinion
need not serve as precedent where it says nothing that has not previously
been said.286 This is so when the result is plainly dictated by well-reasoned
precedent with unquestioned applicability and sharp contours, even when
the opinion involves application of these uncontroverted principles to a
novel, but expected, set of facts. The Strickland application illustrates this
point well. In that event, the relevant legal principles exist already in the
litigants’ toolbox; all pending and future litigants have the benefit of all
pertinent legal rules, and the principle of adjudicative retroactivity is not
offended.
Applying this framework, the Fourth Circuit’s Syncor International Corp. v.
McLeland,287 discussed in Part I,288 is an illustrative example of an unpublished
decision that ought to have precedential effect. Had the case merely required
application of settled precedent governing review of an arbitrator’s order, the
court could have dispatched the case in a nonprecedential opinion. However,
the case posed a new question that was not settled by existing Fourth Circuit
precedent: whether the parties could contract around the judicial review
provisions set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act.289 Having no case law on
point, the Fourth Circuit adopted the analysis of a sister circuit.290 Because

282. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (stating that a rule is not dictated by
prior cases when it has overruled a prior case).
283. See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 (2004) (stating that, where reasonable jurists
disagree, a prior case does not compel a particular result).
284. In this respect, this paradigm parts ways with the approach used by the four circuits
that employ something resembling a new rule construct. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
285. See Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 352–53 (2013).
286. See, e.g., id. at 348–49.
287. No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997).
288. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text.
289. See Syncor, 1997 WL 452245, at *5–6.
290. See id. at *6–7 (citing Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993,
996–97 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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in doing so, the court laid down a rule that was not “dictated by” prior
Fourth Circuit precedent, principles of adjudicative retroactivity ought to
have mandated that the case bear precedential weight. The Supreme Court
ultimately resolved the question against the Fourth Circuit, noting that the
Fourth Circuit’s part of the split had taken the form of an unpublished
decision.291 Under settled adjudicative retroactivity doctrine, the case
creating a new rule should not have gone unpublished.

CONCLUSION
The overwhelming federal judicial workload has understandably
inspired many judges and panels to seek some method of triage. But the
responding uptick in shadowy nonprecedential case law cannot be squared
with the Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence unless the body of
unpublished opinions is restricted to cases whose results are foreordained by
prior precedents—that is, opinions that do not create new rules. A handful
of circuits have responded intuitively by limiting nonprecedential opinions
to the routine, unexceptional, and humdrum; far more have not. The resulting
unpublished work product from a majority of jurisdictions frequently stakes out
new ground, creates circuit splits, and gives rise to fractured opinions, quietly
carving out a sizable exception to settled retroactivity doctrine. This exception
has gone unrecognized by courts and commentators. It is also indefensible. It is
premised on convenience and systemic burden. Harper and Griffith rejected
the relevance of both, and Reynoldsville Casket firmly resisted an effort to
bring them in through the backdoor. Thus, nonprecedential opinions that
create new rules lack justification.
Adjudicative retroactivity jurisprudence has probable basis in Article
III and a proper conception of the judicial function. The doctrine has
clearly rejected efforts to restrict the precedential effect of new rules and
specifically rejected efforts to deprive litigants in pending cases of the
benefit of those rules. Where a nonprecedential opinion stakes out new
ground, it plainly violates these settled principles.
Restricting the
nonprecedential opinion to the case that stakes out no new ground—the
garden-variety application of settled rules to expected fact patterns—brings
the phenomenon into harmony with the Supreme Court’s retroactivity
jurisprudence and is consistent with conceptions of the judicial power
underlying Article III. Using the familiar “new rule” construct, the

291. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583 n.5 (2008).
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nonprecedential opinion becomes just that—an opinion that actually lacks
utility as precedent. Declaring nothing new under the sun, it definitionally
relies on settled legal principles that are available to subsequent litigants and,
as such, threatens no violence to existing doctrine.

